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LAW, BIOETHICS, AND MEDICAL FUTILITY: DEFINING PATIENT 
RIGHTS AT THE END OF LIFE 
Frederick R. Parker, Jr.* 
There are few greater disagreements than the meaning of life and death . . . . 
J. Budsziszewski1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As a matter of both law and bioethics, the general question concerning 
the existence of a patient’s right either to accept or refuse care at the end of 
life has largely been resolved through a fairly consistent body of jurispru-
dence, statutory schemes, and pronouncements of professional ethics, all of 
which recognize the fundamental nature of the right to refuse treatment in 
the abstract.2 Notwithstanding the broad-based recognition of that right as a 
matter of principle, both the courts and the various state legislatures have 
struggled to define its boundaries, and issues on the periphery remain the 
topic of discourse among scholars and practitioners in the disciplines of law, 
medicine, and bioethics.3 This continuing discussion concerning the scope of 
the patient’s right takes place primarily at the margin between life and death, 
where physicians, lawyers, and moral philosophers find it most challenging 
to appropriately balance the competing interests of the individual in the ex-
ercise of autonomy and of the community at large in the preservation of 
life.4 
 
 * J.D., Louisiana State University; LL.M. (in Health Law), University of Houston; 
LL.M. (in Taxation), New York University. Professor, Louisiana State University in Shreve-
port; Of Counsel, Onebane Law Firm, Shreveport and Lafayette, Louisiana. 
1.  J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WHAT WE CAN’T NOT KNOW xxii (Ignatius Press 2011) (2003). 
 2. See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW 
OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING §§ 2.01–2.06, 7.01–7.03 (3rd ed. 2004). These issues ini-
tially arose when surrogates for permanently unconscious patients who did not satisfy the 
legal criteria for “whole brain death” began to refuse treatment that offered no reasonable 
hope of either restoring the patient’s capacity or reversing the dying process. Perhaps the 
most widely cited United States Supreme Court case in this regard is Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). See also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, 
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 170–81 (4th ed. 1994). 
 3. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, §§ 7.01–7.15. 
 4. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823, 830 (N.J. Super. 2010) (“[T]he 
public has at least an equal, if not greater, interest in a patient’s right to live than in a patient’s 
right to die.”). The courts also have recognized countervailing state interests in preventing 
suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent third 
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Historically, the debate concerning life-sustaining treatment centered 
on the negative aspect of the patient’s right either to withhold recommended 
treatment at the outset of care, or to withdraw treatment that already had 
been initiated.5 In contrast with the traditional view of this right as a nega-
tive one, the contemporary variant of the question asks whether the right to 
refuse recommended treatment necessarily encompasses the right to compel 
interventions that have not been offered, and, if so, what constraints might 
limit the exercise of that positive right.6 
This aspect of the question finds expression in two principal forms. The 
first relates to the right of a permanently unconscious or otherwise severely 
and irreversibly incapacitated patient to compel the provision of treatment 
that would merely postpone the moment of death. The second reflects a nu-
anced application of the negative right to refuse one particular form of 
treatment by combining with it the positive right to demand another: under 
what circumstances might established principles of law and bioethics recog-
nize the right of a terminally ill patient, not only to refuse artificial nutrition 
and hydration, but to be rendered unconscious and then maintained in that 
state without sustenance until death ensues? 
At first blush, these questions might appear separate and unrelated: one 
bearing upon the limit of a patient’s right to demand treatment that his phy-
sician considers futile as a restorative measure, and the other implicating the 
scope of the patient’s right to refuse treatment that will prolong his life. It is 
submitted, however, that the responses to both questions are informed by 
identical principles of law and bioethics. Accordingly, this article focuses on 
those principles as common reference points to address the specific issues of 
(1) when should the law define treatment as so futile that the patient has no 
positive right to demand it, and (2) in any particular case where all available 
interventions are futile in that sense, under what circumstances should the 
law accord the patient a positive right to receive palliative care in the form 
of being sedated to unconsciousness, having exercised in advance the nega-
tive right to withhold or withdraw nutrition and hydration and thus pre-
arrange death at a time of his choice. 
The first of these issues relates to the right of a permanently incapaci-
tated patient to have a surrogate speak on his behalf about the provision of 
treatment his physician considers to be medically futile. As a preliminary 
matter, therefore, it is appropriate first to consider the relevance of a pa-
tient’s capacity to that question. 
 
parties. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985), and MEISEL & CERMINARA, 
supra note 2, § 2.01. 
 5. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 13.06. 
 6. Id. 
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II. MEDICAL FUTILITY AND THE SEVERELY INCAPACITATED PATIENT: THE 
RELEVANCE OF CAPACITY TO THE PHYSICIAN’S EXERCISE OF MEDICAL 
JUDGMENT AND THE PATIENT’S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
Despite the significant volume of discourse and commentary on the 
matter, neither the various state legislatures, the courts, practicing physi-
cians, nor bioethicists have been able to find any consensus on a meaningful 
definition of medical futility.7 As traditionally expressed, these questions are 
most commonly framed in the context of a physician’s exercise of profes-
sional medical judgment when determining whether a proposed treatment 
regimen offers a meaningful physiological benefit under the specific cir-
cumstances of a patient’s case.8 The more contemporary version of the fu-
tility debate goes beyond this fundamental issue and asks under what cir-
cumstances a physician may override a patient’s request for treatment that is 
non-curative but nevertheless offers an identifiable, though temporary, phys-
iological benefit.9 
This contemporary expression of the futility issue most commonly 
arises when a surrogate insists on the indefinite continuation of artificial 
nutrition and hydration on behalf of a patient who has been diagnosed as 
 
 7. In general, it has been said that futility is not “a discrete and definable entity, [but] 
merely the end of the spectrum of therapies with very low efficacy.” MEISEL & CERMINARA, 
supra note 2, § 13.03[B]. In the narrow sense, treatment would be considered futile if it lacks 
efficacy in terms of being able to accomplish the specific physiological objective for which it 
is sought. Physicians generally are regarded as having the professional prerogative to unilat-
erally withhold or withdraw such objectively futile clinical interventions, and to do so with-
out the patient’s consent. In a broader sense, however, futility has been described as “the 
inability to prolong life for a time,” or the “inability to maintain an acceptable quality of life.” 
Id. § 13.03[B]. The American Medical Association considers decisions about interventions 
that are not futile in an objective physiologic sense to be sufficiently value laden as to make 
them a matter of the patient’s prerogative. See, e.g., Code of Med. Ethics Op. 2.037, Medical 
Futility in End-of-Life Care, AM. MED. ASS’N (1997), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2037.page. 
 8. One might expect this lack of consensus to become increasingly problematic as our 
population ages and as financial considerations increasingly constrain the provision of health 
care, making the issue likely to be both more common and more significant over time. See 
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 13.09. According to Professor Meisel, the futility 
debate might be difficult to resolve because it “revolves around fundamentally irresolvable 
moral conflicts concerning our most deeply held beliefs about the value of life.” Id. § 13.03 
(quoting E. Haavi Morreim, Profoundly Diminished Life: The Casualties of Coercion, 24 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 33, 33 (1994)). It also has been suggested that the debate about medi-
cal futility will arise with increasing frequency as the scope of advance directives expands 
beyond their traditional purpose of expressing the patient’s wishes concerning the withhold-
ing or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment to directing the administration of treatment that 
physicians might consider to be futile. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 7.01[B][3], § 
13.09. See also Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilat-
erally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007). 
 9. Pope, supra note 8. 
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being in a persistent vegetative state, a state of permanent unconsciousness, 
or another such state of severe and irreversible incapacity.10 On occasion, for 
example, physicians have withdrawn nutrition and hydration from perma-
nently unconscious patients after concluding that the continuation of treat-
ment would merely (and indefinitely) prolong the patient’s physical exist-
ence without offering any hope for his return to a sapient state. Physicians 
have withheld treatment in these cases unilaterally, and despite clear evi-
dence that the patient would have wanted the treatment to continue under 
the circumstances, or in direct contravention of a clear direction to that ef-
fect by an authorized surrogate.11 
Some physicians would justify a unilateral decision to withdraw treat-
ment in such cases as the legitimate exercise of medical judgment, and some 
courts would frame the question in that manner.12 The logic of a focus on 
professional judgment breaks down, however, unless treatment also would 
be withdrawn from a similarly-situated patient who has a reasonable pro-
spect of regaining consciousness. It could not be said that a professional 
custom of unilaterally withdrawing treatment only from permanently uncon-
scious patients reflects the exercise of professional discretion concerning the 
efficacy of a procedure that a physician reasonably expects to prolong life. 
Rather, such a custom would appear to reflect the physician’s value judg-
ment concerning the right of severely incapacitated patients to accept or 
refuse treatment.13 
Viewed in that light, it is submitted that the medical futility debate in 
its contemporary form raises questions that don’t necessarily relate to the 
exercise of medical judgment or the circumstances under which treatment is 
futile (and thus beyond the scope of a physician’s professional obligation to 
provide it). Rather, it compels us to consider whether there is something 
different about a patient with a severe cognitive impairment that qualifies 
his general right under the law of informed consent to have a surrogate 
speak on his behalf. Much of the tension in the debate about medical futility 
 
 10. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Patients in a 
persistent vegetative state generally maintain sufficient brain stem function to enable them to 
breathe, digest food, and produce urine without assistance. They tend to experience cycles of 
sleep in which their eyes are closed and of awakening, in which their eyes are open. They 
might smile, utter unintelligible sounds, and move their eyes and limbs, though sporadically, 
and they might exhibit reflexive responses to physical stimuli by grimacing, coughing, or 
gagging, all of which give the appearance of consciousness when there is none. In contrast, 
persons in a coma are in a sleep-like state and exhibit no indications of consciousness. See, 
e.g., MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND 
ETHICS 530–31 (7th ed. 2007). 
 11. See e.g., Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 30732, p. 5–7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/26/98); 
719 So. 2d 1072, 1075–76. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. 
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arises more out of a fundamental conflict of visions concerning that issue 
than the respect to be accorded the exercise of medical judgment. 
Some participants in this debate would resolve the futility question 
with reference to the traditional legal and ethical principles that have come 
to define the scope and durability of one’s general right to accept or refuse 
medical treatment at the end of life.14 Increasingly, however, others are com-
ing to question the relevance of those principles in the context of a patient 
who has no reasonable prospect of returning to a sapient existence, especial-
ly when the continued provision of care offers a prognosis for an extended 
physical life that may span years rather than mere hours or days. With re-
spect to patients in a persistent vegetative state, for example, Peter Singer 
has said: 
They are not self-conscious, rational, or autonomous, and so considera-
tions of a right to life or of respecting autonomy do not apply. If they 
have no experiences at all, and can never have any again, their lives have 
no intrinsic value. Their life’s journey has come to an end. They are bio-
logically alive, but not biographically.15 
One who adheres to this view would deny the relevance of principles 
concerning one’s fundamental right of self-determination by simply denying 
that a permanently unconscious patient possesses such a right. 
Others would argue that any human being should be defined as the sub-
ject of rights and intrinsic value by virtue of what he is, by nature, rather 
than with reference to any actual capacities he might possess at any point in 
time during his life.16 Adherents to this view would find it both illogical and 
unjust to define one’s rights with reference to his state of consciousness: 
To base the intrinsic value of a being on an accidental attribute—such as 
consciousness or the immediately exercisable capacity for conscious-
ness—is to base a radical moral difference on a mere quantitative onto-
logical difference. We treat beings who are subjects of rights radically 
differently from the way we treat other beings. The basis for that radical 
difference in treatment must be some radical difference in the different 
types of beings treated differently. Between any human being and a 
corpse or an aggregate of tissues and organs there is a radical difference. 
But the difference between a healthy, self-conscious human being and a 
human being incapacitated, even severely incapacitated, is only a differ-
ence in degree. It is unjust, then, to pick out such an accidental attribute 
as self-consciousness or the immediately exercisable capacity for self-
consciousness and make that the criterion for whether someone should 
 
 14. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 170. 
 15. PATRICK LEE & ROBERT P. GEORGE, BODY-SELF DUALISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 
AND POLITICS 152 (2008) (quoting PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (3rd. ed. 1993)). 
 16. Id. at 154–55. 
190 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
be treated as a subject of rights or not. Thus, a human being is valuable 
as a subject of rights in virtue of what he or she is (a person, a subject 
with the basic nature capacity for conceptual thought and free choice 
even if he or she cannot right now actualize that basic capacity). And so 
a human being remains a subject of rights, someone who has a right not 
to be intentionally killed, for as long as he or she exists.17 
It is submitted that established principles of both law and bioethics 
concerning the right of a patient to accept or refuse medical treatment im-
plicitly reflect and rest upon this conclusion.18 For that reason, the argu-
ments presented in this Article are premised upon the following assump-
tions: 
1. Because biological life is essential and intrinsic to human person-
hood, a person comes into being not later than the time of his birth, by 
which time the human organism itself has been identified as a discrete bio-
logical entity that is “a whole . . . member of the species homo sapiens;”19 
 
 17. Id. at 155. A detailed discussion about the scientific and philosophical grounds for 
this perspective is presented in LEE & GEORGE, supra note 15. In short, a member of the 
species castor canadensis, without his tail, is still a beaver, a member of the species syl-
vilagus floridanus, without her ears, is still a bunny, and a member of the species homo sapi-
ens, without his or her consciousness, is still a human being, and thus a “person” in the eyes 
of the law. 
 18. Advance directive statutes, by definition, rest on this premise. See generally 
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 170–81 (discussing surrogate decision-making, 
which rests on the fundamental rule of law that the right either to give or refuse consent to 
treatment survives incapacity, thus leaving for resolution only one’s preference under the 
circumstances). 
 19. LEE & GEORGE, supra note 15, at 122. Professors Lee and George ground this rea-
soning in the science of embryology, from which they conclude “the life of an individual 
human being begins with the joining of sperm and ovum, which yields a genetically and 
functionally distinct organism, possessing the resources and active disposition for internally 
directed development toward human maturity.” Id. at 118–19 (citing WILLIAM J. LARSEN, 
HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY (3rd ed. 2001); KEITH L. MOORE & T.V.N. PERSAUD, THE DEVELOPING 
HUMAN: CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY (7th ed. 2003); RONAN R. O’RAHILLY & 
FABIOLA MÜLLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND TERATOLOGY (3rd ed. 2001); SCOTT F. 
GILBERT, DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY (7th ed. 2003)). More specifically, they announce “three 
important points.” Id. at 120. First, they announce that the embryo, from its inception, is 
distinct from any cell of either the father or the mother, as reflected in the fact that “[i]ts 
growth is internally directed to its own survival and maturation, a distinct end from the sur-
vival and flourishing of the mother in whose body this distinct organism resides.” Id. Second, 
they announce that the embryo possesses the genetic composition of a human being. Id. 
Third, they announce that the embryo “is a whole, though obviously immature, human be-
ing.” Id. 
  Professors Lee and George distinguished the embryo as a separately identifiable 
organism from the gametes whose union brought it into existence by noting: 
They are not only genetically but also functionally identifiable as parts of the 
male or female potential parents. Each has only half the genetic material needed 
to guide the development of an immature human toward full maturity, and none 
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2. A person ceases to exist only when the biological function of the 
human body is extinguished by death; 
3. Every human person is, by definition, indistinguishable from his or 
her body, both the person and the bodily organism constituting but one and 
the same entity. Accordingly, a human person is a particular form of physi-
cal organism that integrates into one uniquely identifiable being both biolog-
ical life and the kinds of things that persons, by nature, have the capacity to 
do. The person is an “embodied mind” or a “living bodily entity” rather than 
a consciousness that possesses or inhabits a body, or a series of conscious 
experiences. In short, one’s self, or person, is so inextricably identified with 
the human physical organism that we are essentially bodily beings;20 and 
4. Every human being is intrinsically valuable as a bearer of rights by 
virtue of what he or she is. Further, just as no human being can come to be 
and later acquire intrinsic value, so no human being can continue to be but 
lose the intrinsic value imputed to him or her as a subject of rights.21 
 
of these cells will survive long. They clearly are destined either to combine with 
an ovum or sperm or to degenerate. Even when they succeed in causing fertiliza-
tion, they do not survive; rather, their genetic (and cytoplasmic) material enters 
into the composition of a distinct, new organism. 
Id. at 120–21. In contrast with the gametes, they state: 
The human embryo, from beginning of fertilization onward, is fully programmed 
actively to develop himself or herself to the mature stage of a human being. And 
unless deprived of a suitable environment or prevented by accident or disease, 
this embryo will actively develop itself in its own distinct direction, toward its 
own survival and maturity. The direction of its growth is not extrinsically deter-
mined, but is in accord with the genetic information and cytoplasmic factors 
within it. The human embryo is, then, a whole (though immature) and distinct 
human organism—a human being. 
Id. at 121. 
 20. LEE & GEORGE, supra note 15, at 132. 
 21. Professor Budziszewski relates the logic of attributing intrinsic value to all human 
beings. 
To be a person is to be a proper subject of absolute regard—a “neighbor” in the 
sense of the Commandments—a being of the sort whom the Commandments are 
about. It is persons whom I am not to kill, persons whom I am to love as I love 
myself. But what is a person? If we accept the biblical revelation that man is the 
imago Dei, the image of God, then every human being is a person—a person by 
nature, a kind of thing different from any other kind, a being whose very exist-
ence is a kind of sacrament, a sign of God’s grace. Trying to understand man 
without recognizing him as the imago Dei is like trying to understand a bas-relief 
without recognizing it as a carving.  
 . . . . 
In contemporary secular ethics, the ruling tendency is to concede that there 
are such things as persons, but to define them in terms of their functions or ca-
pacities—not by what they are, . . . but by what they can do. . . . To give but a 
single well-known illustration, philosopher Mary Ann Warren defines “person-
hood” in terms of consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, the capacity 
to communicate about indefinitely many topics, and conceptual self-awareness. 
192 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
These premises are consistent with the longstanding recognition in 
American law that a patient’s right to express either an informed consent or 
a knowing refusal concerning treatment is not conditioned upon a finding of 
capacity—rather, that right both arises and is extinguished with the patient’s 
life.22 
III. DEFINING MEDICAL FUTILITY AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The law of end of life decision making arose over the past 40 years 
primarily from two related developments: advances in forms of medical 
 
If you can do all those things, you’re a person; if you can’t, you’re not. The func-
tional approach to personhood seems plausible at first, just because—at a certain 
state of development, and barring misfortune—most persons do have those func-
tions. But Warren thinks persons are their functions . . . . 
. . . [U]nborn babies are not capable of reasoning, complex communication, 
and so on. . . . If unborn babies may be killed because they lack these functions, 
then a great many other individuals may also be killed for the same reasons—for 
example, the asleep, unconscious, demented, addicted, and very young, not to 
mention sundry other cases such as deaf mutes who have not been taught sign 
language. 
. . . [We need] to stop confusing what persons are with what they can typical-
ly do. 
. . . [A functional definition is] appropriate for things that have no inherent 
nature, whose identity is dependent on our purposes and interests—things that do 
not intrinsically deserve to be regarded in a certain way, but which may be re-
garded in any way that is convenient. For example, suppose I am building an au-
tomobile and I need to keep two moving parts from touching each other. . . . An-
ything can be a spacer that fills the space . . . . The particular lump of matter I use 
to accomplish this purpose is not intrinsically a proper subject of absolute regard; 
my regard for it—even its very identity as a spacer—is relative to how I want to 
use it, or to what I find interesting about it. 
By contrast, if I am a person, then I am by nature a rights-bearer, by nature a 
proper subject of absolute regard—not because of what I can do but because of 
what I am. Of course, this presupposes that I have a nature, a “what-I-am”, which 
is distinct from the present condition or state of development of what I am, dis-
tinct from my abilities in that condition or stage of development, and, in particu-
lar, distinct from how this condition, stage of development, or set of abilities 
might happen to be valued by other people. In short, a person is by nature some-
one whom it is wrong to view merely functionally—wrong to value merely as a 
means to the ends or the interests of others. If you regard me as a person only be-
cause I am able to exercise certain capacities that interest you, then you are say-
ing that I am an object of your regard not in absolute but only in a relative sense. 
. . . And so the functional definition of personhood does not even rise to the dig-
nity of being wrong. 
See BUDZISZEWSKI, supra note 1, at 74–77. 
 22. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985) (“The right of an adult who, like 
Claire Conroy, was once competent to determine the course of her medical treatment remains 
intact even when she is no longer able to assert that right or to appreciate its effectuation.”); 
See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRLLESS, supra note 2, at 170. 
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intervention that enabled the indefinite maintenance of biological life for 
patients who did not desire such treatment, and the concern of health care 
providers about the legal implications of withdrawing treatment at the re-
quest of those patients or their surrogates.23 Although these cases first came 
before the courts in the context of permanently unconscious patients, they 
eventually led to legislative responses in the form of advance directive stat-
utes that (i) expressly recognized the right of all persons to refuse life-
sustaining treatment in certain circumstances and (ii) immunized physicians 
from liability when they act in accordance with their patients’ decisions to 
withhold or withdraw such measures.24 
The following discussion begins by setting forth a general overview of 
these statutory schemes and relating how they have been construed in the 
evolving debate over the problematic meaning of medical futility. It then 
analyzes that construction in light of both legislative intent and statutory 
structure. This analysis reveals that although advance directive statutes have 
a legitimate bearing on the definition of medical futility, they are increasing-
ly being used to inform the definition of that term in a manner that contra-
dicts both their intended purpose and fundamental bioethical norms. Finally, 
the discussion considers recent legislative efforts to resolve futility disputes 
by focusing on process rather than definition, and it suggests how those pro-
cesses might not only reconcile conflicts between physicians and their pa-
tients about treatment decisions but also return advance directive statutes to 
their original ethical moorings. 
A. Advance Directive Statutes and Implications for Defining Treatment as 
“Futile”   
The customary advance directive statute reflects the negative implica-
tion of the doctrine of informed consent: if a physician is obligated to obtain 
a patient’s consent prior to providing treatment, the clear inference is that 
the patient has a corresponding right to deny that consent.25 Although one’s 
 
 23. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 2.01. Although many of the 
early cases arose in the context of competent patients who objected to treatment either on 
religious grounds or simply as a matter of personal preference, the rapid emergence of ad-
vanced medical technology since the 1970s provided the main impetus for the modern so-
called “right-to-die” cases. Such technology has enabled biological life to be sustained almost 
indefinitely by a combination of devices for artificial respiration, circulation, feeding and 
hydration. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 328 (1990). 
 24. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 7.01[C]. 
 25. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103–04 (Kan. 1960) (“Anglo-
American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination. It follows that 
each man is considered the master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, 
expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment. A 
doctor might well believe that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but 
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exercise of this right generally is not controversial, it becomes problematic 
when the refusal relates to treatment that either would prevent death or ex-
tend the life of a patient who has been diagnosed with a terminal condition. 
A refusal of treatment in either of those cases would bring the patient’s spe-
cific interest in self-determination into conflict with the state’s broader in-
terests in preserving life,26 preventing suicide,27 preserving the ethical integ-
rity of the medical profession,28 and protecting members of vulnerable 
groups.29  
Advance directive statutes represent legislative efforts to balance these 
competing interests. The fact that they tend to be narrow in scope, however, 
reflects the inherent difficulty of fulfilling that purpose. For example, these 
statutes commonly acknowledge in broad, general terms that patients have a 
 
the law does not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the patient by any form 
of artifice or deception.”) See also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1222. 
 26. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1239. Some commentators have observed that 
the predominant jurisprudential trend is to view the state’s interest in preserving the life of 
any particular individual as dependent on that individual’s interest in preserving his own life, 
and that most courts seem to have abandoned any effort to balance the individual’s right to 
refuse treatment with the state’s interest in preserving life. See, e.g., HALL ET AL., supra note 
10, at 531. The United States Supreme Court noted in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 729–30 (1997), however, that the states “may properly decline to make judgments about 
the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy,” and “[t]his remains true, as Cru-
zan makes clear, even for those who are near death.” (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282). With-
out regard to the perceived momentum of the states toward qualifying their interests in pre-
serving life, that fact would not bear upon the issue when the patient has affirmatively re-
quested treatment. Meisel has summarized the general judicial consensus concerning this 
right as follows: 1) patients, whether competent or incompetent, have both a common law 
and a constitutional law right to refuse treatment; 2) the state’s interest in opposing a compe-
tent patient’s right to forgo life-sustaining treatment is “virtually nonexistent,” and the state’s 
interest is “very weak” with respect to incompetent patients who have a dim prognosis for 
recovery (although the state likely would not disavow that interest if the patient has chosen 
not to exercise his right to refuse treatment; as noted by Professor Meisel, “the right of self-
determination has . . . traditionally been thought to require that treatment not be forgone 
without the informed consent of one legally authorized to provide it.” MEISEL & CERMINARA, 
supra, note 2, § 2.06.); 3) decisions about life-sustaining treatment generally should take 
place in the clinical setting, although the courts are available to resolve disputes about those 
decisions; 4) surrogate decision makers for incompetent patients should express the patient’s 
own preferences to the extent made known prior to the loss of capacity, and to the extent the 
patient’s preference is unknown, decisions should be made on the basis of the patient’s best 
interests; 5) physicians and surrogates may rely on an incompetent patient’s advance directive 
in ascertaining the patient’s preferences concerning life-sustaining procedures; 6) artificial 
nutrition and hydration is a form of medical treatment that may be withheld or withdrawn 
under the same conditions as other forms of medical treatment; and 7) the withholding or 
withdrawal of medical treatment is both morally and ethically distinct from euthanasia and 
assisted suicide. Id. § 2.02. 
 27. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990). 
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fundamental right to control decisions relating to their medical care, and that 
this right encompasses the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. However, 
they tend to be vague in terms of defining the ultimate scope of that right, 
commonly expressing only the right of terminally-ill patients to refuse 
treatment that would merely postpone the moment of death, but remaining 
silent with respect to one’s right to withhold or withdraw other forms of 
treatment that offer a reasonable prospect of reversing the dying process.30 
Moreover, and in a manner consistent with the state’s recognized inter-
est in preserving life, these schemes commonly define the right to refuse 
treatment as a voluntary matter solely within the patient’s discretion, thus 
establishing that the law does not require the withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining procedures in any particular case.31 Likewise, these statutes 
 
 30. The Louisiana statute, for example (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1–
1299.58.10 (1985)), expressly provides that a patient who has been diagnosed as having a 
“terminal and irreversible condition” has the right to withhold or withdraw “life-sustaining 
procedures,” which by definition serve only to prolong the dying process. LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(A)(1) (1985). The 1989 version of The Uniform Rights of the Terminal-
ly Ill Act (URTIA) is similarly limited to “treatment that is merely life-prolonging, and to 
patients whose terminal condition is incurable and irreversible, whose death will soon occur, 
and who are unable to participate in treatment decisions.” UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY 
ILL ACT, Prefatory Note (1989) [hereinafter URTIA]. According to Meisel, “several” states 
have adopted the URTIA in either its 1985 or 1989 version. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra 
note 2, § 7.04[B]. Other statutory schemes, however, are broader in scope. The Uniform 
Health-Care Decisions Act (UHCDA): 
acknowledges the right of a competent individual to decide all aspects of his or 
her own health care in all circumstances, including the right to decline health 
care or to direct that health care be discontinued, even if death ensues. . . . The 
Act recognizes and validates an individual’s authority to define the scope of an 
instruction or agency as broadly or as narrowly as the individual chooses. 
UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, Prefatory Note (1994) [hereinafter UHCDA]. Accord-
ing to the Uniform Law Commission’s Legislative Fact Sheet, the UHCDA had been adopted 
by Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Wyoming as of 2014, 
although the advance directive statutes of some states appear to be modified forms of the 
UHCDA. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Legislative 
Fact Sheet–Health Care Decisions Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.
org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Health-Care%20Decisions%20Act (last visited Mar. 7, 
2015). See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, §§ 7.03[B][1], 7.06[A][1]–[2] 
(summarizing the law in this regard in other jurisdictions). Notwithstanding the narrow scope 
of this right as expressed in statutory schemes, however, the various advance directive stat-
utes are cumulative with existing law. According to Meisel, “they are intended to preserve 
and supplement existing common law and constitutional rights and not to supersede or limit 
them.” See id. § 7.03[B][2]. 
 31. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(B) (1985). The URTIA Prefatory 
Note states that “the Act is not intended to affect any existing rights and responsibilities of 
persons to make medical treatment decisions.” URTIA, Prefatory Note. Sections 10(f) and 
11(d) of the URTIA suggests the voluntary nature of the patient’s choice under the Act (Sec-
tion 10(f) provides that a person who coerces or fraudulently induces an individual to execute 
a declaration under the Act is guilty of a crime, and Section 11(d) states that “[the Act] cre-
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commonly provide that they are not to be construed as condoning euthana-
sia.32 Taken together, therefore, it might be fair to say that these provisions 
suggest a legislative intent to affirm and retain the state’s traditional interest 
in preserving life, both where the patient has chosen not to exercise his right 
to refuse treatment and under circumstances that fall beyond the express 
provisions of the statute. 
To give practical effect to the patient’s right of self-determination and 
to encourage physicians to respect patient preferences, these statutes cus-
tomarily incorporate immunity schemes that insulate physicians from liabil-
ity when they follow their patients’ decisions to withhold or withdraw 
treatment in accordance with the limited scope of the law.33 They also ex-
pressly deny any intent to interfere with the exercise of “medical judg-
ment”34 or to require the provision of “life-sustaining procedures”35 or treat-
ment that is “medically inappropriate,”36 “medically ineffective,”37 “contrary 
to generally accepted health-care standards,”38 or “contrary to reasonable 
medical standards.”39 
Although these provisions originally were enacted in order to alleviate 
concerns by physicians who were uncertain about the legal and professional 
consequences of failing to provide treatment that would prolong a patient’s 
 
ates no presumption concerning the intention of an individual who has revoked or who has 
not executed a declaration with respect to the use, withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment in the event of a terminal condition.”). Id. §§ 10(f), 11(d). The UHCDA 
Prefatory Note provides that the model version of that Act “seeks to ensure to the extent 
possible that decisions about an individual’s health care will be governed by the individual’s 
own desires,” and both the text of Section 2(e) of the UHCDA and the “Optional Form” 
included in Section 4 appear to reflect this general intent. UHCDA, Prefatory Note, §§ 2(e), 4. 
Paragraph 7 of the “Optional Form,” for example, appears to allow the declarant broad dis-
cretion to either refuse or direct the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration. Id. § 4. See 
also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 7.03[B][2]. Other provisions of the UHCDA, 
however, indicate that the patient’s authority to compel the provision of such care is less 
certain than a cursory glance might suggest. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
 32. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.58.10(A) (2014); URTIA § 11(g); UHCDA 
§ 13(c). See also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra, note 2, § 7.07[D]. 
 33. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.8(A)(1) (2012); URTIA § 9; UHCDA § 
9. According to Meisel: “statutes do not confer wholesale immunity; rather, most confer 
qualified immunity conditioned on the physician’s acting in good faith and pursuant to rea-
sonable medical standards.” MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 7.10[E]. 
 34. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(B)(3) (1985). 
 35. See, e.g., id. § 40:1299.58.1(A)(4). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., UHCDA § 7(f). According to the comments, “medically ineffective . . . 
means treatment which would not offer . . . any significant benefit.” Id. § 7 cmt. 
 38. See, e.g., UHCDA § 13(d). 
 39. See, e.g., URTIA § 11(f). 
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life,40 they have come to be relied upon not only to justify a physician’s ac-
quiescence when a patient refuses such treatment, but to substantiate the 
denial of treatment that a patient (or his authorized surrogate) has expressly 
requested.41 
Causey v. St. Francis Medical Center42 is an interesting example of 
such a case. Sonya Causey, who was 31 years old, quadriplegic, comatose, 
and suffering from end stage renal disease, was totally dependent on a venti-
lator, regular hemodialysis, and the continuous provision of artificial nutri-
tion and hydration.43 Although Sonya’s attending physician believed that 
continued treatment could preserve her life for at least two additional years, 
he was of the opinion that she had an insignificant chance of regaining con-
sciousness.44 He therefore recommended that treatment be withdrawn and 
that Sonya be allowed to die.45 When her family insisted that treatment be 
continued, the physician presented the case to the hospital’s Morals and Eth-
ics Board, which concurred with his recommendation.46 Treatment then was 
withdrawn, and Sonya died shortly thereafter.47 
In response to this unilateral withdrawal of treatment, members of 
Sonya’s family initiated a legal proceeding and sought damages from both 
the physician and the hospital under the theory that the act constituted an 
intentional tort.48 The defendants responded to the petition by filing an ex-
ception of prematurity on the grounds that the case first should have been 
considered by a medical review panel.49 They also argued that the physician 
was under no obligation to provide treatment he considered to be either fu-
tile or “medically inappropriate” within the meaning of the Louisiana ad-
vance directive statute.50 The court demurred on the first prong of this argu-
ment concerning “futility” (a term not employed in the statute) in the fol-
lowing terms: 
 
 40. According to Meisel, “[Advance directive] statutes are intended to provide assurance 
to individuals that their wishes will be respected and to provide assurance to health care pro-
viders that they will be immune from legal liability if they rely on these instructions.” MEISEL 
& CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 7.01[A]. 
 41. See infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
 42. 30732 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/26/98); 719 So. 2d 1072. 
 43. Id. at p. 1, 719 So. 2d at 1073. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at p. 2, 719 So. 2d at 1074. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Causey, 30732 at p. 2, 719 So. 2d at 1074. 
 49. Id. Louisiana conditions the jurisdiction of the courts in actions grounded in medical 
malpractice and informed consent law upon the case first having been submitted for review 
by a Medical Review Panel. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(1)(a) (2008). 
 50.  See Causey, 30732 p. 2–3, 719 So. 2d at 1074–75. 
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Futility is a subjective and nebulous concept which, except in the strict-
est physiological sense, incorporates value judgments. . . . To focus on a 
definition of “futility” is confusing and generates polemical discussion. 
We turn instead to an approach emphasizing the standard of medical 
care.51 
Then, with respect to the second prong of the defense, the court stated 
“[a] finding that treatment is ‘medically inappropriate’ by a consensus of 
physicians practicing in that specialty translates into a standard of care.”52 
On that basis, the court concluded that the action was subject to panel re-
view, and thus sustained the defendants’ exception of prematurity.53 
 
 51.  Id. at p. 4, 719 So. 2d at 1075. 
 52.  Id. at p. 6, 719 So. 2d at 1076. 
 53.  Id. There also was evidence that the physician in Causey based his argument, at 
least in part, on his opinion that continued treatment would have been “medically inappropri-
ate” because he considered it to be inhumane. Id. at p. 7, 719 So. 2d at 1076 n.3. That fact, 
however, arguably would raise only the question of whether the patient would have given 
consent to continuation of the treatment at issue, rather than whether a reasonably prudent 
physician would have considered the treatment to be inhumane. Even if the withdrawal of 
treatment in Causey would have been justified on the grounds of inhumanity, it is arguable 
that the informed consent question would be inappropriate for consideration by a medical 
review panel because of the conflicting legal standards that apply to informed consent issues, 
on the one hand, and standard of care issues, on the other. Those arguments would have been 
resolved with reference to different legal standards because Louisiana is a “material risk” 
jurisdiction for purposes of informed consent law, see, e.g., Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 
So. 2d 398, 411 (La. 1988), whereas issues concerning a physician’s compliance with the 
standard of care are resolved with reference to the professional standard. In this sense, the 
facts of Causey raised an interesting legal issue concerning the role of a medical review panel 
in informed consent cases and the inevitable conflict between these legal standards. Although 
that issue is beyond the narrow scope of this article (which focuses only on the court’s deci-
sion to bypass the issue of futility and turn instead to the standard of care as the relevant 
reference point for determining the scope of the physician’s professional obligation with 
respect to the provision of life-sustaining procedures that a patient or his surrogate insists 
upon), there is no small irony in the fact that the court looked to the Natural Death Act to 
support its decision to sustain the defendants’ exception of prematurity when the Act itself 
would lead to a different result in terms of both legal process and substance. 
  It also is interesting to note that the case arose after treatment had been withdrawn 
and the patient had died. See Causey, 30732 at p. 1, 719 So. 2d at 1073. Had the defendants 
sought judicial sanction for the withdrawal of treatment prior to acting, it is difficult to envi-
sion the court referring the case to a medical review panel. Rather, it most likely would have 
been subjected to an expedited judicial review in order to address the issue of whether the 
patient would have refused consent to continued treatment under the particular circumstances 
of the case. Although resolution of that question might have required the same sort of expert 
testimony that would inform the opinion of a medical review panel, the ultimate issue would 
focus on determining whether the patient would have given consent to continued treatment if 
she were capable of expressing a reasoned decision on the matter. That said, it is interesting 
to consider how the Causey court might have approached the issue had it been raised pro-
spectively, rather than after the fact. 
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It is not altogether surprising that the Causey court chose to evade the 
issue of medical futility by deferring to the medical review panel process, 
particularly in light of the difficulty of defining that concept in the abstract. 
It is arguable, however, that the specific provision of the statute on which 
the opinion rested should have led to a different outcome. 
B. The Relationship Between the Right to Refuse Treatment, Medical 
Futility, Medically Inappropriate Treatment, and the State’s Interest in 
the Preservation of Life 
Contrary to the Causey court’s demurrer, a reasonable argument can be 
made that advance directive statutes like Louisiana’s provide meaningful 
reference points for reducing the admittedly abstract philosophical notion of 
medical futility to a workable legal standard, at least when considered in the 
context of their original purpose. This argument is grounded in the correla-
tion between the concept of medical futility, the state’s interest in the 
preservation of life, and the patient’s right to accept or refuse life-sustaining 
medical treatment.54 Just as these statutory schemes tend to establish the 
objective threshold of one’s unqualified right to refuse treatment, without 
defining the ultimate scope of that right in the abstract, they likewise estab-
lish the objective point at which treatment becomes “futile,” without defin-
ing the ultimate parameters of that definition. 
Questions about medical futility tend to arise when a patient or his sur-
rogate requests treatment the physician believes will offer no meaningful 
medical benefit in a physiological sense. From a legal perspective, these 
questions implicate the law of informed consent and the patient’s correlative 
right to refuse treatment.55 They also necessarily bear upon the state’s rec-
ognized interest in the preservation of life.56 
As noted above, advance directive statutes tend to expressly disavow 
any intent to interfere with the exercise of medical judgment, and they give 
practical effect to that denial by expressly stating that physicians have no 
 
 54. As noted above, the majority of these statutes do not expressly recognize one’s right 
to withhold or withdraw treatment under all circumstances; rather, many advance directive 
statutes are limited in scope not only to patients who are in a terminal condition or who are 
permanently unconscious, but also to forms of treatment that only prolong the dying process 
for such patients. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 55. The right of self-determination traditionally is understood as requiring the patient’s 
consent before treatment is either withheld or withdrawn. See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA, 
supra note 2, § 2.06[A] at 2-25 & n.107. As a practical matter, however, it is arguable that 
these cases are unlikely to be raised on the basis that the patient did not give an informed 
consent because the patient would either have known, or should have known, the risk (or, 
more accurately, the certainty) that accompanies the withholding or withdrawal of treatment 
necessary to sustain life. 
 56. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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obligation to provide either “life-sustaining procedures” or treatment that 
otherwise would be “medically inappropriate,” “medically ineffective,” 
“contrary to generally-accepted health care standards,” or “contrary to rea-
sonable medical standards.”57 It was on such a provision that Sonya Cau-
sey’s physician relied to justify the unilateral withdrawal of treatment that, 
in his opinion, would have been medically inappropriate to continue.58 In 
response to this defense, the court construed the term “medically inappropri-
ate” as raising an issue concerning the physician’s exercise of medical 
judgment, and then went on to hold that it would be premature to consider 
the case on the merits before a medical review panel had addressed the ques-
tion of whether his actions were consistent with the professional standard of 
care.59 
It is submitted that the Causey court erred in taking this approach. Alt-
hough questions about the propriety of any treatment protocol inevitably 
bear upon the physician’s exercise of medical judgment, a reasonable argu-
ment can be made that advance directive statutes do not employ terms such 
as “medically inappropriate treatment” in a manner that necessarily calls 
into question the standard of care. With respect to the Louisiana Natural 
Death Act, for example, reason suggests that a determination of whether 
treatment is “medically inappropriate” should be made primarily in contrast 
to the term “life-sustaining procedure,” against which it is juxtaposed in the 
statute, rather than with reference to the exercise of medical judgment, inter-
ference with which the statute expressly disavows.60 
 
 57. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
 58. See supra notes 50 and accompanying text. 
 59. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. It is not surprising that the court sought 
an opportunity to demur in a case such as this, which the courts have long considered to be 
more appropriately within the realm of the legislature. See, e.g., In re. Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 
407–08 (N.J. 1987) (citing In re. Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (N.J. 1985)) (“We recognize, 
as we did in Conroy, and as have numerous other courts, that given the fundamental societal 
questions that must be resolved, the Legislature is the proper branch of government to set 
guidelines in this area[.] ‘Because the issue with all its ramifications is fraught with complex-
ity and encompasses the interests of the law, both civil and criminal, medical ethics and so-
cial morality, it is not one which is well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial pro-
ceeding. It is the type [of] issue which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum, 
where fact finding can be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institutions and 
disciplines can be presented and synthesized. In this manner only can the subject be dealt 
with comprehensively and the interests of all institutions and individuals be properly accom-
modated.’”); see also Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823, 833 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2010) (“The issues presented are profound and universal in application. They warrant 
thoughtful study and debate not in the context of overheated rhetoric in the battlefield of 
active litigation, . . . but in thoughtful consideration by the Legislature as well as Executive 
agencies and Commissions charged with developing the policies that impact on the lives of 
all.”). 
 60. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(B)(3) (2008). Under this construction, the term 
“medical judgment” would have meaning for purposes of determining whether a patient is 
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The specific statutory provision at issue in Causey provides that it is 
not to “be construed to require the application of medically inappropriate 
treatment or life-sustaining procedures to any patient.”61 The statute’s use of 
the disjunctive “or” to separate these terms suggests quite strongly a legisla-
tive intent to treat them independently. The grammatical basis for this dis-
tinction is buttressed by the fact that a synonymous construction would yield 
a result contrary to the stated purpose of the law by creating an obligation on 
the part of the patient to refuse treatment rather than merely recognizing 
one’s right to do so.62 This result could be avoided only by construing these 
terms separately. This is not to deny that there are occasions when it might 
be “medically inappropriate” for a physician to provide a “life-sustaining 
procedure,” but to say merely that these terms need not universally be con-
strued as synonymous, and that they sometimes must be distinguished in 
order to give effect to the statute’s underlying purpose. 
The necessity of distinguishing these terms can also be demonstrated 
by categorizing treatment modalities in terms of their expected efficacies 
and then correlating them with the patient’s right to accept or refuse treat-
ment, the state’s countervailing interest in the preservation of life, and the 
physician’s professional obligations. This approach not only clarifies the 
meaning of these key terms in the statute, but also leads to a very practical 
definition of futility that comports with the voluntary nature of the patient’s 
right to refuse treatment. 
Because advance directive statutes were intended to establish a reason-
able balance between the competing interests of the individual in exercising 
his autonomy and the state in the preservation of life, reason would posit 
that the states waived that interest to the extent their legislatures expressly 
recognized one’s unqualified right to refuse treatment. Moreover, logic sug-
gests that the state’s interest in preserving life is, by definition, a function of 
the professional expectation that a clinical intervention will positively affect 
a patient’s injury, illness, or disease in a physiological sense. 
It is submitted that the concept of medical futility is an inverted func-
tion of the same expectancy. Thus, under this view, the state’s interest and 
the concept of futility would lie at opposite ends of the same spectrum: as 
the expected benefit from a particular treatment protocol increases, the 
state’s interest grows and futility dims. Likewise, the state’s interest be-
comes ever more dim as the expected benefit from a treatment modality 
declines, making it increasingly futile. This gradation of treatment along the 
 
terminally ill or if the treatment at issue is a “life-sustaining procedure.” Once those determi-
nations have been made, the question of whether the treatment should be provided would 
require not the exercise of medical judgment, but the consent of the patient. 
 61. Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(B)(1)–(2) (2008). 
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spectrum of futility versus efficacy is similar to the correlation historically 
drawn by the courts between the individual’s right to refuse treatment and 
the state’s interest in preserving life: the individual’s right grows and the 
state’s interest diminishes as the degree of invasiveness increases and as the 
prognosis dims.63 
Although the notion of medical futility is admittedly nebulous, this 
analysis offers a meaningful and workable definition of the term in the con-
text of advance directive statutes, and it does so without violating their pur-
pose. It is self-evident that the law would universally define as “medically 
inappropriate,” “medically ineffective,” and objectively “futile” any inter-
vention that offers no prospect of relieving, mitigating, or deterring the pro-
gression of an illness, disease, or injury.64 It follows that neither the profes-
sional standard of care nor the state’s interest in preserving life would obli-
gate a physician to provide such measures, nor would the law recognize a 
patient’s right to demand them.65 
 
 63. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (“The nature of Karen’s care 
and the realistic chances of her recovery are quite unlike those of the patients discussed in 
many of the cases where treatments were ordered. In many of those cases the medical proce-
dure required (usually a transfusion) constituted a minimal bodily invasion and the chances of 
recovery and return to functioning life were very good. We think that the state’s interest 
contra weakens and the individual’s right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion 
increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual’s 
rights overcome the state interest.”). 
 64. Physicians are not ethically obligated to provide care that has no reasonable chance 
of benefiting their patients. See, e.g., Code of Med. Ethics Op. 2.035, Futile Care, AM. MED. 
ASS’N (1994), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2035.page?. 
 65. The President’s Commission on Bioethics explains a physician’s ethical duties in 
this regard as follows: 
Respect for the self-determination of competent patients is of special im-
portance in decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment because different people 
will have markedly different needs and concerns during the final period of their 
lives; living a little longer will be of distinctly different value to them. Decisions 
about life-sustaining treatment, which commonly affect more than one goal of a 
patient (for example, prolongation of life and relief of suffering) create special 
tensions. Nonetheless, a process of collaborating and sharing information and re-
sponsibility between care givers and patients generally results in mutually satis-
factory decisions. Even when it does not, the primacy of a patient’s interests in 
self-determination and in honoring the patient’s own view of well-being warrant 
leaving with the patient the final authority to decide.  
Although competent patients thus have the legal and ethical authority to 
forego some or all care, this does not mean that patients may insist on particular 
treatments. The care available from health care professionals is generally limited 
to what is consistent with role-related professional standards and conscientiously 
held personal beliefs. A health care professional has an obligation to allow a pa-
tient to choose from among medically acceptable treatment options (whether 
provided by the professional or by appropriate colleagues to whom the patient is 
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Such objectively inappropriate interventions, however, differ signifi-
cantly from treatment modalities that yield an identifiable physiological 
effect, even if the expected benefit offers no hope of an ultimate remedy. To 
place a patient’s affirmative request for such treatment at the discretion of 
his physician, as a matter subject to the exercise of medical judgment, would 
seriously distort the traditional balance in the physician-patient relationship. 
This conclusion is grounded both in the doctrine of informed consent and in 
most advance directive statutes, which clearly recognize that the patient’s 
right to withhold or withdraw treatment is a permissive right rather than a 
legal duty.66 
Two legal consequences might be inferred whenever a patient has cho-
sen to exercise this right: first, that a refusal of treatment that would merely 
prolong the dying process implicitly and automatically effects the state’s 
waiver of its interest in preserving life, and second, that a physician’s provi-
sion of such treatment after the patient has refused it would be “medically 
inappropriate” and contrary to “generally-accepted health care standards” or 
“reasonable medical standards.” In this sense, the patient’s refusal of treat-
ment would reflect his own subjective determination that it would be “fu-
tile” for him to receive it, without regard to the unique, personal reasons that 
might have led him to that conclusion. In effect, this approach would define 
futility with reference to the patient’s subjective preference, as justified by 
the voluntary nature of his right either to accept or refuse treatment. Thus, it 
is submitted that the law would define any “life-sustaining procedure” as 
both “medically inappropriate” and “futile” if, in fact, the patient has de-
clined it.67 
 
referred) or to reject all options. No one, however, has an obligation to provide 
interventions that would, in his or her judgment, be countertherapeutic. 
Report, President’s Comm’n Study of Ethical Problems in Med. and Biomedical & Behavior-
al Res., Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in 
Treatment Decisions, at 44 (1983), http://hdl.handle.net/10822/559344 (last visited Nov. 14, 
2014). 
 66. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 67. The same logic would support a definition of treatment as futile if its provision to a 
patient who permanently lacks decision-making capacity would cause such intolerable and 
interminable pain that the courts would infer his decision to refuse it under either the pure or 
the limited objective tests as developed by the court in In re Conroy. See discussion infra 
note 93 and accompanying text. The facts of Causey also raise the issue of whether the physi-
cian’s unilateral act of withdrawing life-sustaining procedures would be legitimated by the 
fact that continued treatment would have been inhumane. The professional standard arguably 
would be relevant if the patient has not directed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
and is suffering (in which event it might be appropriate to apply a version of either the “pure 
objective” or “limited objective” test developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Conroy 
when addressing the propriety of a physician’s unilateral decision to withdraw a life-
sustaining procedure; a determination that the patient was suffering arguably would be sub-
ject to the professional standard and, thus, to review by a medical review panel). The Conroy 
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Reason compels the opposite conclusion with respect to treatment the 
patient has expressly requested.68 Advance directive statutes suggest quite 
strongly the legislative intent to retain the state’s interest in preserving life 
in such cases, as evidenced by their express provisions that (i) clarify the 
voluntary nature of the patient’s right,69 (ii) deny that any presumption is to 
be drawn from a patient’s silence,70 and (iii) require that any doubt concern-
ing application of the statute be resolved in favor of preserving life.71 
Finally, a rational extension of this logic also suggests something fur-
ther: that many of these statutory schemes reflect the legislative intent, not 
only to retain the state’s interest in preserving life when the patient has not 
exercised his right to refuse a “life-sustaining procedure” (which, by defini-
tion, would merely postpone the moment of an inevitable death without af-
fecting the underlying condition that places the patient on that trajectory), 
but implicitly to translate that interest into the patient’s correlative right to 
 
court employed these tests to find a presumption that the patient would have refused treat-
ment if he were capable of arriving at a reasoned decision. Under the “pure objective” test, 
treatment may be withheld or withdrawn even in the absence of any evidence that the patient 
would have refused care as long as he is suffering intolerable and intractable pain, such that 
treatment would be inhumane. The related “limited objective” test would apply where there 
exists “some evidence” that the patient would have refused treatment and where the burdens 
of treatment “clearly and markedly outweigh” the benefits of that treatment. Neither the “pure 
objective” or “limited objective” test, however, would justify a physician’s unilateral decision 
to withhold or withdraw a “life-sustaining procedure.” Rather, these tests would be consistent 
with the voluntary nature of the patient’s decision to refuse treatment, because they merely 
provide a means of inferring whether the patient would exercise that right if he were capable 
of expressing a reasoned choice. Further, the objective tests developed in Conroy are interest-
ing when applied to a case like Causey, because they were devised to address the withholding 
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from conscious but incompetent patients in a nurs-
ing home who tend to be subject to a more significant risk of abuse than patients in the hospi-
tal setting. The patient in Causey, however, not only was unconscious, but she was in the 
hospital where regular physician consultations and ethics committee reviews were available. 
The hospital had submitted the case for review by the ethics committee, which found that 
treatment should be withdrawn even over the objection of the patient’s surrogate decision 
maker, and the physician defended his decision to withdraw treatment on the grounds that the 
patient was suffering. To withhold treatment from a patient who is suffering would be justi-
fied, however, not on the grounds of “futility,” but by the inference that the patient would 
have refused it. 
 68. This is not to say that the patient’s silence is to be taken either as an implicit ac-
ceptance or as a refusal, but that the core issue relates to the determination of whether the 
patient would have refused or accepted the treatment if he were capable of expressing a rea-
soned decision. See discussion supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 69. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 70. See, e.g., URTIA § 11(d). 
 71. See, e.g., id. § 1 cmt. (“[T]he Act intends to err on the side of prolonging life.”); see 
also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58(10)(E) (2008). (“It is the policy of the state of Loui-
siana that human life is of the highest and inestimable value through natural death. When 
interpreting this Part, any ambiguity shall be interpreted to preserve human life . . . .”). 
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insist that such procedures be provided.72 In short, it is submitted that the 
voluntary nature of a patient’s “negative” right to refuse treatment that will 
merely postpone the moment of death implicitly affords a corresponding 
“positive” right to compel its provision, and that the state’s interest in pre-
serving life continues unabated with respect to those interventions until such 
time as the patient has in fact refused them. To construe the law in any other 
manner would permit physicians to unilaterally withhold or withdraw treat-
ment, thereby defeating both the voluntary nature of the patient’s decision to 
either accept or refuse such treatment and the very purpose of advance di-
rective statutes. 
C. Construing Advance Directive Statutes as Authorizing the Unilateral 
Withholding or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment by Physi-
cians on the Basis of Futility 
Notwithstanding the argument set forth above with respect to the ap-
propriate construction of the Louisiana statute at issue in Causey and similar 
schemes in other jurisdictions, there is an increasing view among physi-
cians, health care institutions, and some bioethicists that, as a matter of poli-
cy, the law should authorize unilateral decisions to withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining treatment even over the insistence by a patient or his surro-
gate that it be provided. Adherents to this view also have contended that 
certain existing advance directive statutes reasonably could be construed in 
that manner.73 Their argument focuses primarily on the perception that it 
would be meaningless to provide such treatment to unconscious and severe-
ly debilitated patients who are not expected to regain capacity.74 
Some statutes are more amenable to this construction than others.75 One 
of the most interesting is the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act,76 which 
 
 72. See, e.g., discussion infra at notes 76–97 and accompanying text concerning the 
Uniform Health Care Decisions Act. 
 73. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Even as Doctors Say Enough, Families Fight to Prolong 
Life, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/27/national/27death.
html?_r=0; see also Report, Will Your Advance Directive Be Followed?, ROBERT POWELL 
CTR. FOR MED. ETHICS (2013), available at http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/medethics/WillYour
AdvanceDirectiveBeFollowed.pdf [hereinafter Medical Ethics Report]. 
 74. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); see also In re 
Quinlan, 355 A2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 75. See Pope, supra note 8 for a comprehensive discussion of this question. See also, 
Medical Ethics Report, supra note 73, at 7–11 (classifying the various state advance directive 
statutes into groups based upon the degree to which their literal terms expressly protect a 
patient’s affirmative directive for the provision of life-sustaining treatment). In declining 
order of protection, the Medical Ethics Report categorizes the statutes as either: (1) “unpro-
tective laws,” which authorize health care providers not to comply with a patient’s advance 
directive on the basis of “ethics and judgments of medical inappropriateness,” and require the 
unwilling provider to undertake reasonable efforts to effect a transfer to another provider who 
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has the imprimatur one might associate with any legislative proposal drafted 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws with 
the purpose of giving consistency among the states concerning significant 
issues of law.77 
Some would say that the Uniform Act was drafted not only to clarify 
the patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, but also to expressly 
authorize physicians to unilaterally withhold or withdraw treatment that, in 
their opinion, would be futile to provide.78 This argument rests primarily on 
provisions of the Act that authorize health care providers to disregard patient 
directives they find objectionable either “for reasons of conscience”79 or 
because they call for “medically ineffective health care or health care con-
trary to generally accepted health-care standards.”80 
Although certain provisions of the Uniform Act lend credence to this 
construction, other provisions contradict it, and the force of the argument 
that the Act favors physician autonomy over patient self-determination be-
 
is willing to comply with the patient’s choice, but without expressly requiring that life-
sustaining treatment be provided pending the transfer; (2) “questionable laws,” which author-
ize health care providers not to comply with a patient’s directive if they are able to locate 
another provider who is willing to do so, but nevertheless are silent about the patient’s right 
to receive life-sustaining treatment pending transfer; (3) “laws with time limits for life-
preserving measures,” which require unwilling health care providers to administer life-
sustaining treatment pending transfer of the patient who insists on such treatment, but only 
for a limited time; and (4) “protective laws,” which expressly require the provision of life-
sustaining treatment until the patient is actually transferred to a willing provider, with no time 
limit on that obligation. Id. 
 76. See UHCDA, Prefatory Note. 
 77. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafts model 
acts in critical areas of state statutory law with the purpose of promoting clarity, stability and 
consistency among the states. The Uniform Commercial Code is perhaps the most widely-
recognized of the Commission’s proposed legislation. See generally The National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://uniformlaws.org 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2015). 
 78. See, e.g., Pope, supra note 8, at 55. Professor Pope explained this argument as fol-
lows: 
Some have suggested that the UHCDA’s unilateral decision provisions were 
not written in contemplation of futility disputes, but rather exclusively “in con-
templation of the opposite situation” in which the family wants to reject treat-
ment but the health care provider wants to continue. Indeed, the UHCDA does 
focus on patient autonomy and the empowerment of patients and surrogates.  
Nevertheless, the legislative history of the Uniform Act clearly shows this 
charge to be untrue. The UHCDA Commissioners specifically contemplated and 
sought to relieve health care providers of any obligation to provide inappropriate 
treatment. Moreover, the very logic of the UHCDA compels an interpretation 
that authorizes providers to unilaterally terminate LSMT [life-sustaining medical 
treatment]. 
Id. 
 79. See UHCDA § 7(e). 
 80. See id. § 7(f). 
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comes less compelling the more closely one parses the text. These challeng-
es are most directly posed by specific provisions in the Act concerning the 
form a patient’s advance directive might take, the narrow scope of the im-
munity accorded physicians who decline to comply with a patient’s health 
care directive, and the foundational principles on which advance directive 
statutes historically were established.81 
First, express provisions of the “model form” advance directive incor-
porated as part of the Uniform Act suggest that it was intended to recognize 
the individual’s right to compel the provision of certain forms of treatment. 
Section 4 of the Act specifically provides that patients may direct the provi-
sion of artificial nutrition and hydration regardless of their medical condi-
tion, and without regard to the decision they might have made either to ac-
cept or forego other forms of life-sustaining interventions.82 This provision 
contradicts the view that the Act would authorize physicians to deny re-
quests for such measures. 
The limited scope and structural ambiguity of the Uniform Act’s im-
munity provisions also challenge the notion that it was drafted with the in-
tention of transmuting the patient’s right to refuse treatment into the physi-
cian’s authority to deny it. Although Section 9 immunizes providers from 
civil or criminal liability when they act “in good faith and in accordance 
with generally accepted health-care standards,” the scope of this immunity 
expressly embraces only three specific circumstances: (1) when the provider 
complies with the “decision of a person apparently having authority to make 
a health-care decision for a patient, including a decision to withhold or 
withdraw care”;83 (2) when the provider declines to comply with “a health-
care decision of a person based on a belief that the person then lacked au-
thority”;84 and (3) when the provider complies with “an advance health-care 
directive assuming that the directive was valid.”85 These terms do not im-
munize a provider who overrides a patient’s decision by withholding or 
withdrawing treatment on the grounds that it would have been “medically 
ineffective” or that its provision would be “contrary to generally accepted 
health care standards.”86 Thus, like the immunity provisions found in other 
advance directive schemes, those of the Uniform Act appear to be condi-
tioned upon the physician’s compliance with a valid directive that treatment 
be withheld. 
 
 81. Other, less direct challenges relate to the adverse consequences that such a physi-
cian-centric construction would portend to the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of 
the medical profession. 
 82. See UHCDA § 4, ¶7. 
 83. See UHCDA § 9(a)(1). 
 84. See id. § 9(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 85. See id. § 9(a)(3). 
 86. See id. § 9(a). 
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The Act’s silence concerning the granting of immunity to physicians 
who override a patient’s choice is difficult to square with a conclusion that 
the statute was drafted with the intention of conferring any such authority. 
As a practical matter, this might bring pause to a physician who is consider-
ing whether he should deny treatment that a patient or his surrogate has re-
quested. This silence becomes even more disconcerting if one accepts the 
proposition asserted earlier with respect to the court’s decision in Causey: 
the proposition that the voluntary nature of the patient’s right either to ac-
cept or refuse treatment logically suggests that such measures would be 
“medically ineffective” or “contrary to generally accepted health care stand-
ards” only if the patient has in fact refused them.87 
Both the model form set forth in the Uniform Act and the limited scope 
of the Act’s immunity provisions muffle any certainty that it could have 
been drafted with the intention of conferring on physicians the sole authority 
to decide whether or not life-sustaining treatment will be provided in any 
particular case. This ambiguity is compounded when the Act is viewed in 
light of the original purpose these laws were intended to serve. That purpose 
was to seek a legislative balance between the state’s interest in preserving 
life and the patient’s interest in self-determination, both of which the courts 
have long recognized as matters of constitutional significance. 
Perhaps the most widely cited of the cases dealing with this question is 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.88 Addressing the consti-
tutionality of a Missouri statute that required clear and convincing evidence 
of a patient’s decision to decline treatment, the Cruzan court noted the infer-
ence, readily apparent from previous Supreme Court decisions, that the 
Fourteenth Amendment affords a constitutionally-protected liberty interest 
in refusing unwanted medical treatment. The Court then stated that the find-
ing of such an interest was merely the beginning of the inquiry, and that 
“whether respondent’s constitutional rights have been violated must be de-
termined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state inter-
est.”89 More specifically, the Court indicated that the scope of the patient’s 
 
 87. See supra notes 54–68 and accompanying text. The comments of the various Com-
missioners about the need for meaningful evidence of the patient’s subjective preference 
appear to be consistent with this argument. See, e.g., Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. 
State Laws, PROCEEDINGS OF COMMITTEE ON THE WHOLE: UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS 
ACT, p. 57, l. 25 through p. 59, l. 20; p. 60, l. 6 through p. 61, l. 16; p. 64, l. 18 through p. 65, 
l. 10 (1993). 
 88. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 89. Id. at 279 & n.7 (citing Youngblood v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982); Mills v. 
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982)). In the context of the right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment, the New Jersey Supreme Court described those state interests as (1) preserving the life 
not only of the particular patient, but “preserving the sanctity of all life,” (2) preventing sui-
cide, (3) safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession, and (4) protecting innocent 
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right must be determined by weighing his interest in refusing treatment 
against the state’s interest in preserving life: 
We do not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of an in-
formed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to 
death. 
. . . . 
[W]e think a State may properly decline to make judgments about the 
“quality” of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert 
an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed 
against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual.90 
In seeking to balance these competing interests, advance directive stat-
utes tend to expressly acknowledge only the right of a terminally ill or per-
manently unconscious patient to refuse treatment that would merely prolong 
the dying process, thus implicitly waiving the state’s otherwise unqualified 
interest in preserving life in those narrow circumstances.91 Moreover, in 
determining whether treatment should be withheld or withdrawn from a pa-
tient who lacks decision making capacity but previously issued no clear di-
rective, the law has employed different evidentiary standards to confirm the 
patient’s subjective preference.92 Those evidentiary standards vary depend-
ing upon whether the patient is conscious, but of uncertain capacity,93 or 
 
third parties who may be harmed by the patient’s treatment decision. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 
1209, 1223–24 (N.J. 1985). 
 90. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280–82. See also Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 
(1997). 
 91. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 7.04[A][1]. 
 92. See, e.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209. 
 93. See id. at 1229–32. In Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court said as follows: 
[W]e hold that life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an 
incompetent patient when it is clear that the particular patient would have refused 
the treatment under the circumstances involved. The standard we are enunciating 
is a subjective one, consistent with the notion that the right that we are seeking to 
effectuate is a very personal right to control one’s own life. The question is not 
what a reasonable or average person would have chosen to do under the circum-
stances, but what the particular patient would have done if able to choose for 
himself.  
. . . .  
[Where there exists insufficient evidence to establish what the patient would 
have decided], life-sustaining treatment may also be withheld or withdrawn 
[from a conscious patient in a nursing home] if either of two “best interests” tests 
. . . is satisfied.  
Under the limited objective test, life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or 
withdrawn . . . when there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would 
have refused the treatment, and the decision maker is satisfied that it is clear that 
the burdens of the patient’s continued life with the treatment outweigh the bene-
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whether he is permanently unconscious.94 Neither consciousness nor capaci-
ty, however, has ever been a distinguishing factor in the law for purposes of 
determining the scope of one’s fundamental right to refuse treatment in the 
abstract. The only relevant distinction goes to the issue of establishing the 
fact of the patient’s subjective preference in any particular case.95 Both the 
 
fits of that life for him. By this we mean that the patient is suffering and will con-
tinue to suffer throughout the expected duration of his life, unavoidable pain, and 
that the net burdens of the prolonged life . . . markedly outweigh any physical 
pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction that the person may 
still be able to obtain from life. 
. . . .  
In the absence of trustworthy evidence, or indeed any evidence at all, that the 
patient would have declined the treatment, life-sustaining treatment may still be 
withheld or withdrawn . . . if a third, pure objective test is satisfied. Under that 
test, . . . the net burdens of the patient’s life with the treatment should clearly and 
markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from life. Further, the re-
curring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient’s life with the treatment 
should be such that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be 
inhumane. Subjective evidence that the patient would not have wanted the treat-
ment is not necessary under this pure-objective standard. Nevertheless, even in 
the context of severe pain, life-sustaining treatment should not be withdrawn 
from an incompetent patient who had previously expressed a wish to be kept 
alive in spite of any pain he might experience. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 94. In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647 (N.J. 1976). In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
said the following:  
We have no doubt . . . that if Karen [in a persistent vegetative state] were herself 
miraculously lucid for an interval (not altering the existing prognosis of the con-
dition to which she would soon return) and perceptive of her irreversible condi-
tion, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the life-support appa-
ratus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death. . . .  
. . . We perceive no thread of logic distinguishing between such a choice on Ka-
ren’s part and a similar choice which . . . could be made by a competent patient 
terminally ill. 
Id. at 663 (emphasis added). The approach in Quinlan is referred to as the “substituted judg-
ment” standard, in which a surrogate speaks on behalf of the patient, effectuating the decision 
the patient would have made had she been able to formulate and express it. Substituted judg-
ment necessarily entails consideration of the patient’s personal value system, prior statements 
she might have made about medical care under similar circumstances, her personality, and 
her philosophical, religious, and ethical values. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 
1987). 
 95. See, e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990), which involved a 31-year-
old man who had been irreversibly quadriplegic and dependent on a ventilator since he was 
10 years of age. Kenneth sought permission to terminate his ventilator upon learning that his 
father’s death from cancer was imminent, despairing “over the prospect of life without the 
attentive care, companionship and love of his devoted father,” who had been his only care-
giver since his mother died several years before. Uncertain about the legal consequences of 
acceding to Kenneth’s request, his physicians were uncomfortable in terminating the ventila-
tor without the approval of the court. Ironically, as Kenneth’s father saw his own death draw 
nearer, and not knowing what the court would decide, he took it upon himself to terminate 
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jurisprudence and advance directive statutes have a long and consistent his-
tory of confirming the primacy of the patient’s subjective preference in these 
matters.96 
This well-established history, tradition, and underlying purpose of ad-
vance directive statutes would be wholly inverted if the Uniform Act were 
to be construed as authorizing physicians to unilaterally withhold or with-
draw life-sustaining treatment. This fact alone should inform one’s inquiry 
concerning the Act’s intended effect, particularly where the patient’s life is 
in the balance.97 Moreover, when advance directive statutes are considered 
 
the ventilator as a preemptive measure to ensure that Kenneth’s wishes would be respected. 
Kenneth’s father died one week later, and the court issued its opinion approximately three 
weeks thereafter. Father Succumbs to Cancer After Fulfilling Son’s Death Wish, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Oct. 12, 1990 at A15, as cited by HALL ET AL., supra note 10, at 537–38. The 
court found that Kenneth’s desire to end his life was driven primarily by his concerns about 
what his life would be like after the death of his father, and concluded that his right to refuse 
treatment outweighed the state’s interest in preserving his life. Most significantly for purpos-
es of this discussion, the court “attach[ed] great significance to the quality of Kenneth’s life 
as he perceived it under the particular circumstances that were afflicting him.” McKay, 801 
P.2d at 625. See also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In 
Bouvia, the court stated the following: 
As in all matters lines must be drawn at some point, somewhere, but that deci-
sion must ultimately belong to the one whose life is in issue.  
Here Elizabeth Bouvia’s decision to forego medical treatment or life-support 
through a mechanical means belongs to her. It is not a medical decision for her 
physicians to make. . . . It is not a conditional right subject to approval by ethics 
committees . . . . It is a moral or philosophical decision that, being a competent 
adult, is hers alone. 
Id. at 305 (emphasis added). 
 96. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 1989) (“Illinois has a 
strong public policy of preserving the sanctity of human life, even if in an imperfect state. . . . 
[T]he key element in deciding to refuse or withdraw artificial sustenance is determining the 
patient’s intent . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Greco v. U.S., 893 P.2d 345, 354 (Nev. 
1995) (Shearing, J. and Rose, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“this court has 
also recognized that the value of an impaired life is not always greater than the value of non-
life. . . . In addition, the legislature has recognized this fact in setting forth the policy of this 
state concerning the deprivation of life-sustaining procedures. . . . In these statutes, the legis-
lature made clear that a person may choose not to sustain life. The underlying policy recog-
nizes that, in some situations, non-life may be preferable to an impaired life; further, the 
policy recognizes that each individual has the right to make his or her determination as to the 
relative value of life and non-life.”) (emphasis added); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 408, 411 
(N.J. 1987) (“We approach this task with great humility, for we recognize that ‘[t]o err either 
way—to keep a person alive under circumstances under which he would rather have been 
allowed to die, or to allow that person to die when he would have chosen to cling to life—
would be deeply unfortunate.’ . . . [T]he value of life is desecrated not by a decision to refuse 
medical treatment but ‘by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of 
choice.’”) (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1206, 1220, 1224 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 97. Even those who advocate for a constitutional right to physician-assisted death 
acknowledge the significance of this traditional focus. As expressed by amici before the 
United States Supreme Court in the cases of Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), 
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in their context as natural corollaries to the law of informed consent, and in 
light of the consistent jurisprudence that historically has required clear evi-
dence of the patient’s decision to refuse treatment, the question might be 
more informative if it were rephrased to ask what state interests would justi-
fy the withholding or withdrawing of treatment from a patient who request-
ed it (or, conversely, what state interests would justify the denial of a pa-
tient’s right not to refuse treatment by authorizing his physician to exercise 
that right on his behalf). 
D. Resolving the Uncertain State of the Law Concerning the Relationship 
Between Advance Directive Statutes and Medical Futility 
The discussion thus far suggests that the law continues to struggle with 
the notion of medical futility, both in the abstract and in the context of ad-
vance directive statutes. The Causey court, for example, was understandably 
reluctant to address the issue from a philosophical perspective, but it found 
no greater comfort in the specific provisions of the Louisiana statute. As 
argued above, however, the case might have been resolved with greater cer-
tainty had the court considered the definition of “medically inappropriate 
treatment” as a sui generis term, and in light of the specific structure and 
purpose of the Louisiana Natural Death Act.98 In this manner, the court 
could have concluded as a matter of definition that the treatment at issue 
was neither futile nor medically inappropriate.99 
 
and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), the patient’s voluntary choice should be the distin-
guishing moral factor in these cases. 
It is certainly true that when a patient does not wish to die, different acts, each of 
which foreseeably results in his death, nevertheless have very different moral 
status. . . . A doctor violates his patient’s rights regardless of whether the doctor 
acts or refrains from acting, against the patient’s wishes, in a way that is de-
signed to cause death. 
Brief for Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11, Wash. v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 708956, at *11 (emphasis add-
ed). 
 98. See generally Pope, supra note 8, at 41–42 & n.214–217, 72–74 & n.423–437, 78 & 
n.466. 
 99. It might be fair to say that the issue of futility was a red herring in Causey that 
caused the court to lose its focus on the statute’s express recognition of both the patient’s 
right to decide whether to accept or refuse life-sustaining treatment and the voluntary nature 
of that right. See Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 30732 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/26/98); 719 So. 2d 
1072. Moreover, the court appears to have been further distracted by the question of whether 
the treatment was “medically inappropriate.” See id. at pp. 4–5, 719 So. 2d at 1075–76. Ironi-
cally, the Causey court seems at once to have both invoked and dismissed the relevance of 
the Louisiana advance directive statute to the issue under consideration in that case. See id. at 
pp. 1–7, 719 So. 2d at 1072–76. 
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It is important to bear in mind, however, that even statutes that can be 
construed in a way that effectively defines futile care with reference to the 
patient’s decision to accept or refuse treatment do so more by coincidence 
than design. The correlation of the patient’s choice to the definition is infer-
ential rather than direct, and it follows from the purpose of advance directive 
statutes. These schemes were drafted, not to provide an express definition of 
medical futility, but rather, to give effect to a patient’s basic right to grant or 
deny consent to treatment.100 It would be inconsistent with that purpose, 
however, to construe the statute in a manner that recognizes a physician’s 
unilateral authority to deny the very treatment the statute places at the pa-
tient’s discretion. Thus, while a patient’s refusal of a particular form of 
treatment might establish a basis for defining it as both futile and medically 
inappropriate, it is the exercise of his right to accept or refuse treatment on 
which those definitions turn. In short, the mere fact that treatment would be 
considered as futile if the patient were to refuse it does not render it inher-
ently futile and thus beyond his right to accept. It is this subtle point that the 
Causey court overlooked. 
Although this construction of the Louisiana statute would have equal 
merit under similar schemes in other states, the literal terms of some stat-
utes, such as the Uniform Act, do not as readily lend themselves to that 
view.101 As noted above, some observers strongly contend that the literal 
terms of the Uniform Act accommodate a physician’s unilateral withholding 
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. 
This potential disparity among the states is ironic when one considers 
the fact that many bioethicists initially were concerned that the complexity 
and limited immunity provisions found in these schemes might lead physi-
cians to construe them narrowly, thus effectively constraining rather than 
reinforcing the patient’s ability to refuse treatment without first seeking ju-
dicial approval. The potential for such mischief in the codification of these 
schemes was seen, not in the risk that physicians would deny care that a 
patient had requested, but that they would insist on providing care the pa-
tient did not want.102 The contemporary argument that advance directive 
statutes should be construed to remove end of life decisions from the subjec-
tive preference of patients and place them within the professional discretion 
of physicians is difficult to reconcile to this history. 
Further, while the Uniform Act might appear to resolve the question of 
medical futility if it were to be construed as conferring unilateral decision 
making authority on physicians, that construction would not inform the sub-
stance of the ongoing futility debate. Nor would it relieve physicians of the 
 
 100. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 7.01[C]. 
 101. See discussion supra notes 73–87 and accompanying text. 
 102. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 1.06. 
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potentially significant legal consequences that would follow a unilateral 
decision to withhold or withdraw treatment from a patient who has not re-
fused it.103 Moreover, to construe the act in that manner would not reduce 
the likelihood of judicial involvement in these questions that the courts have 
long regarded as more amenable to resolution in the clinical setting by con-
sensus among physicians, patients, and family members than in the adver-
sarial environment of litigation. To the contrary, it likely would generate 
litigation in a significant number of cases. 
The conflicting arguments about how advance directive statutes should 
be construed in the context of questions about medical futility suggest that 
they might not offer a certain resolution to this controversial issue. Perhaps 
in recognition of that continuing uncertainty, both private and statutory 
methods have been proposed to resolve, on an ad hoc basis, the impasse 
created when patients or their surrogates request treatment that physicians 
believe to be inappropriate under the circumstances. 
In the private sector, some health care institutions have adopted inter-
nal policies that engage their ethics committees in a dispute resolution pro-
cess. These policies commonly provide an option for physicians to unilater-
ally terminate treatment if the committee ultimately determines that a dis-
pute about the appropriate course of care will not be resolved.104 As a practi-
cal matter, however, it has been suggested that physicians would be unlikely 
to follow these policies to their ultimate ends when a dispute proves to be 
intractable.105 
The other possible solution is found in statutory law. Texas, for exam-
ple, has enacted a statute under which a physician who opposes a request for 
life-sustaining treatment may initiate a review of the case by the hospital 
ethics committee.106 Perhaps in order to ensure due process and enhance the 
opportunity of building a consensus about the appropriate course of action, 
the law confers upon the patient’s surrogate the right to attend the meet-
ing.107 If the committee concludes that it would be inappropriate to continue 
treatment under the circumstances of the case, the physician would be obli-
gated both to make a reasonable attempt to transfer the patient to another 
 
 103. Even the immunity provisions of the UHCDA do not encompass a physician’s uni-
lateral withholding or withdrawal of treatment that a patient has not refused. See supra notes 
83–87 and accompanying text. 
 104. See e.g., Code of Med. Ethics Op. 2.037, supra, note 7. 
 105. See Pope, supra note 8, at 69 (noting that, in Texas, providers decided to unilaterally 
stop life-sustaining medical treatment, only in two percent of intractable cases); see also infra 
notes 106–10 and accompanying text. 
 106. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(a) (West 2010). The Texas statute 
does not attempt to define medical futility but to provide a legal process for resolving dis-
putes about the propriety of continued treatment. See Pope, supra note 8, at 80. 
 107. HEALTH & SAFETY § 166.046(b)(2), (4). 
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facility that is willing to comply with his directive108 and to continue provid-
ing care for ten days after the ethics committee’s decision.109 The statute 
authorizes the termination of treatment if the patient has not been not trans-
ferred within the prescribed ten-day window.110 
Although this process-based approach appears to have been well re-
ceived, questions have been raised about certain provisions of the Texas 
statute. For example, it has been suggested that the ten-day transfer window 
might not provide a meaningful period of time within which to locate a fa-
cility and effect the patient’s transfer.111 Questions also have been presented 
about whether the judicial authority112 to extend the transfer deadline is defi-
cient in terms of process.113 Finally, concerns have been expressed about 
potential due process implications arising from conflicts of interest posed by 
the composition of the ethics committee charged with reviewing a physi-
cian’s denial of treatment.114 
These questions aside, a process-based approach would seem to offer a 
more practical and meaningful way to resolve disputes about medical futility 
than an advance directive statute that is either ambiguous or leaves decisions 
about the use of life-sustaining procedures to the physician’s sole discretion. 
Such a scheme arguably would be most meaningful if the body of law it 
relates to is itself structured in a way that minimizes the potential for dis-
putes at the outset. 
In the context of life-sustaining modalities, that potential most likely 
would arise when a statute purports to accord physicians the unilateral au-
thority to withhold or withdraw treatment from a patient who has not re-
fused it.115 As a preliminary matter, therefore, it is submitted that a dispute 
 
 108. Id. § 166.046(d). 
 109. Id. § 166.046(e). 
 110. Id. Although commentators report that this scheme appears to have significantly 
increased ethics consultations in Texas, they also note that providers rarely invoke their au-
thority under the statute to unilaterally withdraw treatment in cases that ultimately prove to 
be intractable. See Pope, supra note 8 at 69 (noting that Texas providers decided to unilateral-
ly stop life-sustaining medical treatment only in two percent of intractable cases). 
 111. Pope, supra note 8 at 80. 
 112. HEALTH & SAFETY § 166.046(g). 
 113. One judge has recommended that the statute be clarified with respect to the court’s 
authority to grant an extension by identifying the court in which the petition to extend the 
time for transfer must be filed and by specifying the process for an appeal when a court re-
fuses to grant an extension. Nikolouzos v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 684 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (Fowler, J., concurring). 
 114. See Pope, supra note 8, at 80. 
 115. Several amici in the assisted suicide cases of Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. 
Quill emphasized the importance of insulating physicians from increasing pressures brought 
to bear on them by society to assist patients in ending their lives when nothing further can be 
done for them. See, e.g., Brief for Bioethics Professors Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers, Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 657754; 
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resolution scheme would be most effective if it were coupled with an ad-
vance directive statute that clearly negates any such authority. Having estab-
lished that foundation, the Texas statute might offer a viable framework for 
establishing a process to resolve futility-related disputes, but with the fol-
lowing modifications: 
(i) the statutory scheme should abate the potential for conflicts of inter-
est due to the composition of the ethics committee by ensuring that it is 
comprised of persons not affiliated either with the health care facility or the 
physicians involved in the patient’s care in a way that would call their inde-
pendence into question and, thus, compromise, by perception, the integrity 
of the review process; 
(ii) the statutory scheme should give the committee sufficient flexibil-
ity and time either to build a consensus concerning the appropriate course of 
treatment or to shape a practical compromise when no consensus is possi-
ble;116 and 
 
Brief of Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Wash. v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 96-110, 95-1858), 1996 WL 656275. For example, 
Professors Annas, Glanz, and Mariner stated that, “[P]hysician assisted suicide is recognized, 
even by the two Circuit Courts of Appeal that have asserted that it is a constitutional right, as 
far too dangerous a right to be exercised by patients and physicians alone.” Brief for Bioeth-
ics Professors Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra at 29. The Family Research 
Council made a similar point: 
[The Hippocratic Oath’s proscription against a physician doing harm to patients] 
. . . is a priceless possession which we cannot afford to tarnish, but society is al-
ways attempting to make the physician into a killer—to kill the defective child at 
birth, to leave the sleeping pills beside the bed of the cancer patient . . . . [I]t is 
the duty of society to protect the physician from such requests. 
Brief of Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra at 4 
(quoting Margaret Mead, Personal Correspondence, quoted in MAURICE LEVINE, PSYCHIATRY 
& ETHICS at 324–25 (1972)). 
 116. One of the most significant ways to enhance the potential for building a consensus is 
by refusing to charge the physician with the responsibility that inevitably would attend the 
unilateral authority to deny treatment. Moreover, the very fact that an independent committee 
would be available to review a proposal to withhold or withdraw care might be likely to 
avoid the creation of adversarial relationships as the course of treatment progresses. 
Knowledge that a committee will be available for review might itself either enhance the de-
velopment of trust or diminish the likelihood of distrust as care progresses. 
  Like many conflicts, disagreements about the provision of treatment are often based 
on personal misunderstandings between the parties and distrust. Two of the key factors likely 
to engender a lack of trust in the medical profession in the context of a physician’s denial of 
life-sustaining treatment are the potential for financial conflicts of interest and the diminished 
respect perceived by terminally ill, disabled, and elderly patients relative to those who are 
young and healthy. According to the American Geriatrics Society (speaking of how concerns 
about physician-assisted suicide were magnified by managed care cost constraints): 
Patients nearing death are generally disabled and their care is costly.  
. . . Decreasing availability and increasing expense in health care and the uncer-
tain impact of managed care may intensify pressure to choose [physician-assisted 
suicide].  
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(iii) the statutory scheme should provide for an expedited process for 
judicial review should the committee be unsuccessful in forging either a 
consensus or a practical compromise to which both physicians and patient 
surrogates agree. 
A statutory protocol that incorporates these features would recognize 
that questions about a patient’s right either to accept or refuse treatment 
generally do not directly relate to the exercise of professional medical judg-
ment. Rather, questions of a professional character tend to be more inci-
dental, relating primarily to determinations about whether a particular form 
of treatment constitutes a life-sustaining procedure within the meaning of 
the advance directive statute or whether the patient satisfies any relevant 
clinical standards that might be set forth in the law (such as a diagnosis that 
he suffers from a terminal and irreversible condition or is in a continual and 
profound comatose state with no reasonable chance of recovery). 
Non-diagnostic questions concerning whether a life-sustaining proce-
dure should be applied in a particular case, on the other hand, pose issues of 
fact about whether the patient would have accepted or refused treatment had 
he possessed the capacity to express a reasoned decision about the matter. 
Because those questions are more subject to legal evidentiary standards than 
professional medical standards, they are not properly the subject of a physi-
cian’s professional discretion. 
Finally, by subjecting unresolved cases to judicial review, such a statu-
tory process would give effect to the well-established rule of law that a pa-
tient’s right either to accept or refuse treatment survives the loss of capacity, 
 
. . . [Physician-assisted suicide] may become inherently coercive in a society in 
which supportive services and medical care are often unavailable. It would be 
ironic, indeed, to have a constitutional right to [physician-assisted suicide] when 
there is no guarantee of access to health care. 
Brief of the American Geriatrics Society as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal of the Judgments 
Below at 24–25, Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 
WL 656290. The National Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities and the Knights of 
Columbus raised a similar concern about the compounded risks posed by the inter-working of 
managed care cost constraints and discrimination based on disabilities: 
In the end, a condition-based rule in favor of assisted suicide would pour into the 
Constitution a poisonous concoction of warm-hearted, misguided pity and cold-
hearted utilitarianism. . . . Who stands to benefit most from a constitutional poli-
cy by which the right to live of vulnerable persons is reduced to an alienable in-
terest? Is it the person with a terminal condition bent on suicide regardless of 
what the Constitution holds, or is it a cost-conscience society seeking more ways 
to ration its generosity? 
Brief of the National Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities and the Knights Of Co-
lumbus as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 22, Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 656342. Although these arguments related to phy-
sician-assisted suicide, the same concerns would seem relevant to the more passive means of 
inducing death by vesting in physicians the unilateral authority to deny life-sustaining treat-
ment. 
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thus clearly denying any lawful authority on the part of a physician to uni-
laterally withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment based on the pa-
tient’s lack of capacity or any other perceived deficit in terms of quality of 
life. 
IV. COUPLING THE WITHHOLDING OF TREATMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF 
MEDICAL FUTILITY WITH THE PROVISION OF AGGRESSIVE PALLIATIVE 
INTERVENTIONS 
The analysis presented thus far would define, as “futile” care, any life-
sustaining treatment that a patient has refused. To so limit the scope of that 
definition, it is submitted, would be consistent with the legislative balance 
found in advance directive statutes between the patient’s right to self-
determination and the state’s interest in preserving life. 
The moral comfort one might find in this balance, however, begins to 
dissipate when the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is combined with 
certain palliative measures. It is true that advance directive statutes tend to 
expressly exclude comfort care from the scope of a patient’s decision to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment and, thus, from the scope of treatment that 
physicians have no obligation to provide.117 Yet, determining the appropriate 
scope of “comfort care” embraced by that exclusion presents its own chal-
lenges. 
It is arguable that a patient who exercises his right under an advance di-
rective statute to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration also would have the 
right to be sedated as a palliative measure to relieve the distress that might 
accompany the withdrawal of sustenance.118 The question becomes much 
more challenging, however, if the facts are inverted. Assume, for example, 
that perpetual sedation to unconsciousness is the only possible form of relief 
for a patient who is experiencing interminable and intractable pain. Realiz-
ing that he will be unable naturally to receive nutrition and hydration after 
being sedated, but recognizing the futility of having that sustenance provid-
ed artificially under the circumstances, the patient expresses in advance the 
decision to refuse it. Within what limits might the law recognize this pa-
tient’s right to be sedated to unconsciousness in order to relieve suffering 
caused by his continuing intractable pain and to couple the act of sedation 
with the withholding of nutrition and hydration, either on the grounds that 
artificial sustenance would constitute a “life-sustaining procedure” under the 
governing advance directive statute or that it would be futile to provide sus-
 
 117. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58 (2008). 
 118. This conclusion, however, rests on the assumption either that an advance directive 
statute would recognize the patient’s unconditional right to refuse nutrition and hydration 
under the circumstances of the particular case or, if not, that the patient’s interest in self-
determination would override the state’s interest in preserving life. 
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tenance when, once sedated, he is expected to remain in an unconscious 
state until death?119 Such cases raise a complex combination of questions 
concerning the scope of a patient’s right to refuse treatment, the definition of 
medical futility, and the existence of a positive right to demand specific clin-
ical interventions that would fall within the range of established professional 
norms in certain circumstances, but be difficult to distinguish from euthana-
sia in others. 
The term “palliative sedation”120 generally refers to the administration 
of sedatives as a means of relieving the intractable pain and other distressing 
symptoms that often accompany the latter stages of a terminal illness.121 
When lesser amounts of sedatives are insufficient to relieve the patient’s 
distress, progressively greater doses are administered, even to the point of 
rendering him unconscious, and sometimes with the understanding that he 
will be maintained in that state until death. Nutrition and hydration are gen-
erally withheld in such cases, and death tends to occur within several days. 
Palliative sedation tends to be implemented only as a last resort after less 
intensive interventions have been exhausted.122 
 
 119. The clinical cases discussed infra at notes 133–155 and related text were developed 
for a Special Report entitled At the Intersection of Tax Policy and Bioethics: Considering 
Tax-Exempt Status in the Context of Palliative Sedation to Unconsciousness. That work, 
which was authored by myself and Charles J. Paine, M.D., appeared in Vol. 66, No. 2 of The 
Exempt Organization Tax Review, at p. 121 (a publication of Tax Analysts), addressed the 
issue of whether a health care facility’s tax-exempt status should be conditioned upon its 
adherence to minimum ethical standards when providing extreme palliative interventions. See 
Frederick R. Parker, Jr. & Charles J. Paine, At the Intersection of Tax Policy and Bioethics: 
Considering Tax-Exempt Status in the Context of Palliative Sedation to Unconsciousness, 66 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 121, 121–122 (2010). Portions of the clinical basis for the tax policy 
discussion in that publication are presented here with the permission of Tax Analysts. 
 120. The practice also is called “terminal sedation,” “deep sedation,” “sedation for intrac-
table distress in the dying patient” (or “SIDD”), “total sedation,” “slow euthanasia,” and 
“sedation to unconsciousness.” See Report, Council on Ethical & Judicial Affs., Sedation to 
Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care, AM. MED. ASS’N (2008), available at 
https://download.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/ethics/x-pub/ceja_5a08.pdf [hereinafter CEJA 
Report 5-A-08]; Sjef Gevers, Terminal Sedation: A Legal Approach, 10 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 
359, 360 (2003); Howard M. Ducharme & Robert J. Kingsbury, Two Perspectives on To-
tal/Terminal/Palliative Sedation, CENTER FOR BIOETHICS & HUM. DIGNITY (Jan. 23, 2002), 
www.cbhd.org/resources/endoflife/kingsbury-ducharme_2002-01-24.htm. 
 121. These symptoms can include anxiety, agitated depression, insomnia, and vomiting. 
See, e.g., Dieter Birnbacher, Terminal Sedation, Euthanasia, and Causal Roles, 9 MEDSCAPE 
GEN. MED., no. 2, 2007, at 48, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
1994875/?report=classic. 
 122. The prevalence of palliative sedation as a means of providing relief to terminally ill 
patients has been estimated to fall within the range of 21% to 54.5%, and it has been suggest-
ed that the average time from sedation to death runs from between two and four days. See 
Rob McStay, Terminal Sedation: Palliative Care for Intractable Pain, Post Glucksberg and 
Quill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 45 (2003). 
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Because palliative sedation can be employed in a manner that closely 
resembles euthanasia, the process has generated considerable discussion in 
both law and bioethics.123 In order to better understand the subtle distinc-
tions between the various modalities of palliative sedation, it might be help-
ful to first identify the characteristics that distinguish palliative sedation 
from its more controversial alternatives, as well as the circumstances under 
which the differences between those alternatives can become blurred. We 
then may consider how the law and bioethical norms inform the use of these 
measures. 
A. Differentiating Palliative Sedation from Physician-Assisted Death and 
Euthanasia 
Palliative sedation entails the use of sedatives in order to relieve pain 
and suffering.124 In contrast with the merely sedative effect of palliative se-
dation, physician-assisted death involves the prescription of a barbiturate 
that enables the patient to immediately terminate his life.125 Voluntary eu-
thanasia, on the other hand, entails an affirmative act by one person to bring 
about the death of another at the latter’s request (generally by the admin-
istration of a lethal concoction).126 Thus, for all practical purposes, palliative 
sedation differs from both physician-assisted death and euthanasia in the 
sense that it does not seek to achieve its palliative effect by affirmatively 
causing death. Physician-assisted death and euthanasia differ from each oth-
er only in terms of the actor’s identity.127 
Unlike physician-assisted death and euthanasia, the act of sedating a 
patient in order to relieve suffering does not directly cause death nor does it 
necessarily accelerate the moment of death.128 This is true whether the seda-
tive is administered proportionately with the degree of suffering or rapidly 
in order to render the patient immediately unresponsive. For this reason, the 
practice is widely perceived as an appropriate means of last resort to relieve 
suffering.129 The logic that undergirds this acceptance begins to break down, 
however, when the “active” intervention of sedation is accompanied by the 
 
 123. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 119. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 125 n.20. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Dr. Jack Kevorkian, for example, initially assisted terminally ill persons in bringing 
about their own death, and later progressed to directly administering the fatal injection him-
self, thus crossing the line from physician-assisted death to euthanasia and leading to his 
conviction for second degree murder. See Dirk Johnson, Kevorkian Sentenced to 10 to 25 
Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1999, at A-1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1999/04/14/us/kevorkian-sentenced-to-10-to-25-years-in-prison.html. 
 128.  See Gevers, supra note 120, at 361. 
 129.  See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 119, at 121–27. 
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preplanned “passive” withholding of treatment in the form of nutrition and 
hydration. It has been argued, in certain cases, that this blending establishes 
a causal connection between the palliative measure and the patient’s death130 
sufficient to justify treating the sedation and withholding as integrated parts 
of a prearranged plan, leading some commentators to argue that the practice 
is merely a disguised form of euthanasia.131 
B. Clinical Modalities, Bioethical Implications, and Legal Consequences 
of Palliative Sedation 
There are two primary adaptations of sedative-type palliative interven-
tions: “proportionate sedation,” in which the sedative is administered in pro-
portion to the patient’s degree of suffering, and “sedation to unconscious-
ness,” in which the patient is rendered immediately unconscious.132 Of these 
varieties, proportionate sedation is the more prevalent and less controversial 
intervention.133 
1. Proportionate Palliative Sedation 
Proportionate sedation entails the progressive administration of the 
minimum amount of sedative necessary to relieve the patient’s suffering at 
any given point along the trajectory toward death.134 For example, it is not 
uncommon for physicians to administer morphine and other sedatives to 
lung cancer patients who are in the terminal stages of their disease process 
in doses that increase proportionally as the intensity of distress deepens.135 
 
 130. Notwithstanding the blurring of these procedures in the eyes of observers who occu-
py both ends of the patient autonomy spectrum, evidence tends to suggest that physicians 
prefer palliative sedation to physician-assisted death (and, by implication, to voluntary eutha-
nasia). See, e.g., Studies Reveal Physicians’ Attitudes on End-of-Life Care, U. IOWA NEWS 
SERVICES, http://www.news-releases.uiowa.edu/2004/december/120604terminal.html (last 
accessed Feb. 4, 2015). According to Lauris Kaldjian, M.D. (the lead investigator in the 
studies cited in this article), physician attitudes appear to be related to their experience in 
caring for terminally ill patients and the frequency with which they attend religious services: 
“those who had cared for a greater number of terminally ill patients in the preceding year 
were more opposed to assisted suicide and also more supportive of terminal sedation. . . . 
[Among those physicians, t]here seemed to be both a greater willingness to be rigorous in 
end-of-life care but also less willingness to cross that line into actually intending death.” Id.; 
see also CEJA Report 5-A-08, supra note 120, at 3. 
 131. For all practical purposes, palliative sedation cannot be identified with physician-
assisted death because the patient would be unable to maintain a sedated state without the 
assistance of another. For this reason, our discussion concerning the problematic aspects of 
palliative sedation is limited to the context of voluntary euthanasia. 
 132. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 119, at 123. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 123–24. 
 135. Id. 
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Even though proportionate sedation is employed with the understanding that 
the dosage necessary to alleviate the patient’s symptoms might, at some 
point, eventuate the loss of consciousness or hasten death by a matter of 
hours or days, the practice does not purpose either of those consequences; 
rather, these results are merely the inevitable effect of relieving suffering at 
the margin of either unconsciousness or death.136 For this reason, propor-
tionate sedation generally is considered to be acceptable from both legal and 
ethical perspectives. 
This acceptance is grounded in a fundamental principle known as the 
rule of double effect.137 According to this principle, it is morally acceptable 
to engage in an affirmative act that inevitably causes harm as long as that 
harm is merely the unavoidable consequence of an attempt to achieve an 
identifiable good.138 The doctrine serves as an exception to the broader bio-
ethics principle of non-maleficence, which holds that a physician must not 
intentionally inflict harm.139 
Now widely employed to justify the use of intense doses of narcotics 
and sedatives as a palliative measure to relieve suffering at the end of life, 
the principle of double effect arose out of the Roman Catholic tradition in 
the context of defining the circumstances under which therapeutic abortions 
might be considered appropriate from a moral perspective.140 For example, it 
is sometimes necessary to treat a pregnant woman’s cancer of the cervix by 
performing a hysterectomy or to remove the fallopian tube from a woman 
who has an ectopic pregnancy in order to prevent a fatal hemorrhage.141 In 
each of these cases, a legitimate medical procedure is employed with the 
intention of saving the mother’s life, though inevitably claiming the life of 
the fetus. Each of these measures would be justified from a moral perspec-
 
 136. Id. 
 137. The rule of double effect is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of double effect or 
the principle of double effect. 
 138. The classical formulation of the rule requires that all four of the following elements 
be satisfied in order for an action to be morally permissible: 
1. The nature of the act. The act must be good, or at least morally neutral (inde-
pendent of its consequences). 
2. The agent’s intention. The agent intends only the good effect. The bad effect 
can be foreseen, tolerated, and permitted, but it must not be intended. 
3. The distinction between means and effects. The bad effect must not be a means 
to achieving the good effect. If the good effect were the direct causal result of the 
bad effect, the agent would intend the bad effect in pursuit of the good effect. 
4. The proportionality between the good effect and the bad effect. The good ef-
fect must outweigh the bad effect. The bad effect is permissible only if a propor-
tionate reason is present that compensates for permitting the foreseen bad effect. 
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 207. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 119, at 124. 
 141. Id.  
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tive under the doctrine of double effect as long as the fetus’s death was an 
unintended (though foreseen and inevitable) consequence of the procedure. 
Stated another way, the physician whose actions inevitably lead to the death 
of the fetus would not violate the principle of non-maleficence where his 
sole purpose was to save the life of the mother, and if the fetus’s death was 
merely the unintended, though foreseen and inevitable result of that legiti-
mate purpose.142 
The same logic justifies the now common use of powerful sedatives as 
a palliative measure when death is near, at least when the sedatives are ad-
ministered in doses that increase proportionally with the patient’s level of 
distress. Although these interventions may render the patient insensate and 
even hasten the moment of death (because of the risk of infection that inher-
ently attends a prolonged period of sedation), it is generally accepted in the 
realms of both bioethics and law that the physician’s singular intent in em-
ploying the sedative is to relieve suffering. This is true even though the 
means of achieving that goal will cause a correlative harm (whether that 
harm is viewed as an eventual unconsciousness, in which state the patient 
would be expected to remain until death, or death, itself, as an inevitable 
complication of maintaining him in deep sedation for an extended period of 
time).143 Thus grounded in the principle of double effect, proportionate seda-
tion has gained wide acceptance within the medical profession as an appro-
priate way to address a patient’s intractable pain and distress during the dy-
ing process, and these interventions are commonly employed for that pur-
pose.144 
2. Palliative Sedation to Unconsciousness  
In contrast with the possibility (and perhaps eventuality) that a patient 
will be rendered unconscious at some point during the course of administer-
ing proportionate sedation, the intervention known as “sedation to uncon-
sciousness” is employed with the specific intent of quickly rendering the 
patient unresponsive and then maintaining him in an unconscious state until 
death.145 Moreover, because most candidates for sedation to unconscious-
 
 142. In its classical expression, the doctrine of double effect would not apply to every 
abortion that might be necessary to save the mother’s life. For example, a woman who has 
serious heart disease might face a significant risk of death unless her pregnancy is terminated. 
However, an abortion in that case would not satisfy all four elements of the doctrine of dou-
ble effect because the action of killing the fetus (the bad effect) would serve as the means to 
save the mother’s life (the good effect). See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 
207–08. 
 143. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 119, at 124. 
 144. See, e.g., CEJA Report 5-A-08, supra note 120; Gevers, supra note 120. 
 145. See, e.g., Mark F. Carr & Gina Jervey Mohr, Palliative Sedation as Part of a Con-
tinuum of Palliative Care, 11 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 76, 76 (2008); Timothy E. Quill et al., 
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ness are unlikely to eat or drink by the time this intervention is considered, it 
tends not to be accompanied by the administration of artificial nutrition and 
hydration.146 This procedure is both less common and more controversial 
than its proportionate counterpart.147 
The complex blurring of intent created by the union of sedation and the 
withholding of nutrition and hydration makes sedation to unconsciousness 
more legally and ethically challenging than proportionate sedation. The pre-
planned coupling of these elements incline some observers to view these 
otherwise unrelated decisions as inseparable components of an integrated 
procedure that is more analogous to euthanasia than merely a passive means 
of relieving suffering.148 
This argument is perhaps most compelling when the patient does not 
suffer from a condition that significantly impairs the ability to ingest food 
 
Last-Resort Options for Palliative Sedation, 151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 421 (2009). A third 
form of sedation, identified by Quill et al. as “ordinary sedation,” is employed both within 
and outside of the palliative care context and provides relief from symptoms without impair-
ing the patient’s level of consciousness. 
 146. See Quill et al., supra note 145, at 422 (“Except under very unusual circumstances, 
artificial hydration and nutrition are not provided.”); Gevers, supra note 120, at 361 (“Termi-
nal patients are not eating or drinking substantial amounts; the patients that are considered for 
deep sedation are not likely to eat and will hardly drink. Although artificial hydration and 
nutrition would seem indicated when the patient is no longer able to eat and drink himself, in 
some patients—in particular those already dying—it will be contraindicated because it would 
only lengthen the dying process. In others—apart from the risk of pulmonary edema and 
other adverse effects—it may be withheld either on the basis of an explicit refusal of the 
patient, or because in the final analysis the patient—taking into account his intolerable situa-
tion and the inevitability of an imminent death—has nothing to gain from it.”); Carr & Mohr, 
supra note 145, at 79 (suggesting that artificial nutrition and hydration are neither palliatively 
nor medically indicated for patients at the terminal stages of their disease process because 
they “often feel no hunger and may be unable to utilize nutrients as a healthy body would.”). 
 147. See, e.g., Parker & Paine, supra note 119, at 123–24. 
 148. See McStay, supra note 122. In this sort of case, it is sometimes logically and ethi-
cally difficult to distinguish palliative sedation to unconsciousness from physician-assisted 
death and voluntary euthanasia. Those who challenge the propriety of palliative sedation to 
unconsciousness draw from legal notions of causation and intent to deny any meaningful 
distinction between that intervention and voluntary euthanasia, simply because death is 
equally certain with either measure. As noted by one commentator: 
While similar to palliative measures as far as the sedation itself is concerned, 
withholding of hydration and nutrition brings terminal sedation into the realm of 
non treatment decisions. At the same time, to the extent that the combination of 
these two measures may shorten the patient’s life, the practice may be easily as-
sociated with euthanasia. It is no surprise, therefore, that terminal sedation has 
been called . . . ‘slow euthanasia’ or ‘backdoor euthanasia,’ suggesting that it 
should be dismissed as a covert form of a practice which is by many already con-
sidered as unacceptable per se. 
Gevers, supra note 120, at 360. See also David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide: Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embracing Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 947 (1997). 
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and fluids. For example, the author is aware of one case in which a former 
cancer patient, though unburdened by intractable pain or other forms of suf-
fering and fully able to ingest nutrition and hydration, requested that she be 
sedated to unconsciousness and then be allowed to die by withholding nutri-
tion and hydration.149 Although thought to be in remission at the time of her 
request, the patient had undergone treatment for several repetitive bouts of 
cancer throughout her life and had become fearful that the cancer would 
return.150 Having fulfilled the responsibility of raising her children, and hav-
ing grown weary of the pain and other discomfort she had experienced dur-
ing the prior episodes of illness, the patient decided that she was ready to 
die, and she was able to locate a facility willing to fulfill her request.151 
Whatever reasoning might have been employed to justify the decision 
in that case, it was not substantiated by the principle of double effect. More-
over, the facts of the case make it difficult to perceive the provider’s effort 
as anything other than the use of sedatives as a thinly-veiled effort to pro-
vide a comfortable euthanasia, but without appearing to have crossed the 
line from inaction to action. 
The fact that such cases cannot always be readily justified under either 
the customary advance directive statute or the doctrine of double effect152 
does not necessarily suggest that sedation to unconsciousness should be uni-
versally dismissed as a disguised but unlawful act of euthanasia. Most cases 
of sedation to unconsciousness tend to be more ambiguous, and it might be 
premature to universally dismiss the rule of double effect as a meaningful 
tool for evaluating these interventions. Without question, serious legal and 
ethical challenges inhere in any palliative intervention that entails a combi-
nation of rendering the patient unconscious and then withholding nutrition 
and hydration until he dies. However, some of these cases can find sanction 
both in the law and principles of bioethics. 
One such circumstance is when the patient’s need for artificially-
delivered nutrition and hydration is driven by an existing medical condition, 
so that the need exists whether the patient is conscious or not. Reason sug-
gests that a decision to withhold nutrition and hydration in such a case 
should be considered on its own, independently of the fact that the patient 
might have been sedated in order to relieve suffering, thus revealing as the 
sole cause of death the underlying medical condition that precipitated the 
need for artificially delivered food and fluids. The act of sedation and the 
 
 149. The author became aware of this case during a personal conversation with the bio-
ethicist who was consulted by the facility after the event. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See LA. REV. STAT. Ann. §§ 40:1299.58.2–.10 (2005). 
226 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
withholding of nutrition and hydration in such a case logically could be con-
sidered as separate and independent events. 
For example, a patient suffering from esophageal cancer who is no 
longer able to swallow and who wishes no further medical intervention in 
the form of artificial nutrition and hydration may request deep sedation to 
the point of unconsciousness in order to relieve the suffering that inevitably 
accompanies the absence of food and fluids, with death by dehydration to be 
expected within a few days. The patient’s right to decline nutrition and hy-
dration would be statutorily recognized because death would be the natural 
result of the underlying condition.153 
Advance directive statutes likewise would sanction the act of sedation 
under an extension of the same logic. Given the law’s express recognition of 
the patient’s right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration under these 
circumstances, it would be incongruous to find an intent to cause death 
when a physician sedates the patient in order to relieve the distress associat-
ed with exercising that right. To the contrary, reason would suggest that the 
sedation was administered as a form of comfort care in order to facilitate the 
patient’s decision, rather than for the purpose of causing death. Logic there-
fore compels the conclusion, not that the patient was sedated and treatment 
withheld so that he would die, but that he was sedated in order to mitigate 
the suffering that otherwise would follow his decision to exercise a choice 
sanctioned both by the law and accepted bioethics principles. 
The factor that justifies this conclusion is the absence of any proximate 
causal relationship between the act of sedation and the patient’s death: since 
the necessity of sedation as a palliative measure arose out of the patient’s 
irreversible inability to swallow, and since that condition would exist with-
out regard to whether he was conscious, there exists no relationship between 
the act of sedation and the patient’s death and thus no logical ground for 
finding that the act of sedation was undertaken with the intent to cause 
death. In such cases, therefore, sedation to unconsciousness can be imple-
mented in a way that denies any resemblance to euthanasia. However, the 
same reasoning cannot always alleviate concerns about the use of sedation 
as a means to cause death. 
Assume, for example, that a patient who suffers intractable pain as a 
result of rheumatoid arthritis requests sedation to unconsciousness and re-
fuses nutrition and hydration. The withholding of food and fluids in this case 
would not be expressly sanctioned by most advance directive statutes be-
cause the patient’s inability to ingest nutrition and hydration would be 
caused by the sedation rather than the progression of the underlying disease. 
By simultaneously creating and refusing to satisfy the patient’s need for 
 
 153. Id. The same result would obtain under the laws of most other states. See, e.g., 
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 7.07. 
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artificial nutrition and hydration, this application of palliative sedation, on 
its face, would appear to be a disguised form of euthanasia.154 
One, however, might envision an argument that this situation can be 
distinguished from euthanasia. For example, an argument grounded in the 
doctrine of double effect might rely on the fact that the sedative was em-
ployed at the minimum dosage necessary to relieve the patient’s pain and 
suffering. Reason would suggest in such a case that the patient did not in-
tend death, but that the loss of both consciousness and the ability to ingest 
nutrition and hydration (which eventually led to his death) were merely 
foreseeable but unintended consequences of a sedative rendered at the min-
imum dosage necessary to obtain the desired pain relief. In short, those who 
subscribe to this reasoning would argue that the sedative should be treated in 
the same manner as if proportionate sedation had been employed, because in 
either case it would have been administered in the minimum dosage neces-
sary to relieve suffering (even proportionate sedation eventually would ren-
der the patient unconscious and unable to receive food and fluids if death 
did not occur first). 
Not everyone who looks to the doctrine of double effect to resolve such 
a case would subscribe to the same reasoning. Many would view this analy-
sis as a cool utilitarian argument that intentionally distorts the doctrine, tak-
ing it beyond reasonable bounds by disguising the act of withholding nutri-
tion and hydration as a passive measure recognized as a lawful right under 
advance directive statutes. Those who subscribe to this view would construe 
the law more narrowly, arguing that advance directive statutes would not 
apply because the patient did not suffer from a “terminal and irreversible 
condition” within the narrow statutory meaning ascribed to that term.155 Ra-
ther, they would see the withholding of treatment under these circumstances 
as an affirmative act that is wholly unrelated to the patient’s legitimate need 
for pain relief, and thus as a proximate cause of the patient’s death.156 
These ambiguities might be said to inhere in most cases that call for ex-
treme palliative interventions, and they are not easily resolved. Perhaps for 
that reason, the courts tend to consider the provision of palliative care to be 
primarily a matter of professional discretion, and it has been suggested that 
 
 154. The artificial nutrition and hydration would not constitute a “life-sustaining proce-
dure” in such a case because the patient would not have a “terminal and irreversible condi-
tion” as defined in section 40:1299.58.2(14) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated. 
See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 7.06. 
 155. Id. 
 156. A wide range of views have been expressed about how to resolve the tension created 
in cases that implicate both the patient’s need for adequate pain relief and societal concerns 
about euthanasia and the ethical integrity of the medical profession. See, e.g., Roger S. Mag-
nusson, The Devil’s Choice: Re-thinking Law, Ethics, and Symptom Relief in Palliative Care, 
34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 559, 559–69 (2006); McStay, supra note 122; CEJA Report 5-A-08, 
supra note 120. 
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the risks posed by the most extreme measures are probably more amenable 
to moderating influence by general clinical policies and guidelines than by 
specific legislation.157 Such guidelines, as recommended by the American 
Medical Association, would both (i) limit the provision of palliative sedation 
to circumstances of unrelieved, severe physical suffering by patients who 
are imminently dying and whose clinical symptoms have been unresponsive 
to other aggressive treatments geared to symptom relief, and (ii) ensure that 
extreme palliative interventions are employed only as a last resort, with the 
intent to relieve suffering rather than to cause or hasten death, and in a man-
ner that does not directly cause death.158 
For all practical purposes, the latter of these guidelines incorporates the 
doctrine of double effect and accommodates the patient’s interest in self 
determination and the state’s interest in preserving life in much the same 
way as advance directive statutes tend to balance these competing interests. 
The patient’s right to demand palliative sedation would thus mirror the 
scope of his statutory right to receive comfort care after having declined 
life-sustaining treatment. At the same time, a physician who opposes the 
most aggressive forms of palliative sedation for reasons of conscience 
should find sanction in these guidelines, which serve as evidence of the pro-
fessional standard of care. The reluctant physician also might find relief in 
the provisions of advance directive statutes that negate any obligation to 
employ procedures that pose the risk of either causing or accelerating death, 
or that otherwise would be inconsistent with the physician’s role as a healer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered two instances that give rise to issues of 
medical futility and the scope of a patient’s right to direct the provision of 
care at the end of life: cases in which a physician invokes the concept of 
medical futility to justify the denial of life-sustaining treatment that a patient 
or his surrogate has requested and cases in which the patient has asked to be 
sedated to unconsciousness in order to relieve unrelenting and intractable 
 
 157. See, e.g., Gevers, supra note 120, at 366 (“What is needed is not so much specific 
legislation, but authoritative clinical guidelines providing a workable protocol on how physi-
cians should proceed.”). 
 158. In addition, the AMA recommends (i) that these guideline ensure that patients or 
their surrogates have provided their explicit informed consent to the use of extreme palliative 
interventions, (ii) that steps be taken to minimize the risks posed by the measures by ensuring 
that physicians are educated about the proper clinical context for their use, (iii) that physi-
cians consult with an interdisciplinary team that includes an expert in palliative care before 
recommending any extreme palliative measure in order to ensure that it is the most appropri-
ate course of treatment, and (iv) that health care facilities establish an internal mechanism to 
review all cases in which patients request these measures. CEJA Report 5-A-08, supra note 
120. 
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pain, and then to be maintained in that state without the provision of nutri-
tion or hydration until he dies (for all practical purposes, a physician who 
accedes to such a request would create the need for life-sustaining treatment 
and then not provide it on the grounds that it would be futile to do so). Legal 
principles of causation would suggest that death was intended in each of 
these cases, thus exposing the physician to potential criminal liability for 
homicide in the form of involuntary euthanasia in the first instance and vol-
untary euthanasia in the second.159 Although prosecution might be unlikely 
in either of these cases as a practical matter, this theoretical risk would exist 
even in states in which physician-assisted death is lawful.160 
The challenges presented by each of these cases differ from the con-
cerns addressed by courts in customary end-of-life cases and by legislatures 
in typical advance directive statutes. The law has traditionally recognized 
that a terminally ill patient does not act with the intent to die when he refus-
es treatment that will serve only to prolong the dying process.161 Rather, the 
 
 159. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 12.04[A]. 
 160. Id. The death-inducing agent in physician-assisted death would not be administered 
by the physician, but by the patient’s own hand. In contrast with this practice, euthanasia 
would be rendered directly at the hand of the physician. In light of this distinction, it might be 
fair to say that the law considers physician-assisted death more as a form of suicide with the 
indirect assistance of the physician rather than as a homicide directly at his hand. See supra 
notes 125–127 and accompanying text. 
 161. The Glucksberg Court specifically addressed the distinction between the passive 
refusal of unwanted medical treatment and the active demand for assistance in committing 
suicide by relying on its holding in Quill for the proposition that “the two acts are widely and 
reasonably regarded as quite distinct.” Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997). In 
Quill, the Supreme Court had rejected the view that the two were entitled to be treated the 
same because the ultimate result in either case was to hasten the patient’s death. Rather, the 
Court found that the distinction between suicide and the refusal of treatment “comports with 
fundamental legal principles of causation and intent.” Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 
(1997). The Court found the distinction relevant from a causation perspective by noting that a 
patient who refuses life-sustaining treatment will die from the natural progression of the 
underlying disease, while a person who ingests a lethal concoction will die from his body’s 
reaction to that substance. Id. In terms of intent, the Court found that a physician who com-
plies with a patient’s decision to withhold or withdraw treatment does not necessarily intend 
the patient’s death. Id. Nor did the Court believe that such an intent could be inferred from a 
physician’s affirmative act of providing aggressive palliative care that unavoidably hastens 
death. Id. at 802. The Court did, however, ascribe a different intent to a physician who assists 
a patient in committing suicide, finding that they “must, necessarily and indubitably, intend 
primarily that the patient be made dead.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused 
on the different responses that follow when a patient continues to live after the withdrawal of 
treatment, on the one hand, and after a failed suicide attempt, on the other. At least in the 
absence of an affirmative attempt to bring about death, the first patient would be allowed to 
continue living. The only consistent course of action for the second patient, however, would 
be to try again. Logic would infer the intent to preserve life in the first example and to cause 
death in the second (where continued life would be deemed a failure). See Brief Amicus 
Curiae of the American Center for Law & Justice Supporting Petitioners, at 23–28, Wash. v. 
Glucksberg, 520 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 656340. This would 
230 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
law considers death in such cases as having resulted from the natural pro-
gression of the underlying injury or disease that precipitated the need for 
treatment.162 For that reason, the law does not consider a physician who 
withholds or withdraws life-sustaining treatment pursuant to a patient’s re-
quest as having acted with the intent to cause death, and advance directive 
statutes tend to expressly confirm this result.163 This rationale breaks down, 
however, both (i) when a physician disregards a patient’s affirmative re-
quest for treatment, and (ii) when he accommodates the patient’s affirmative 
request to be rendered unconscious and then be allowed to die in that state 
without the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration. 
With respect to the first of these alternatives, a physician who with-
holds or withdraws life-sustaining treatment that either the patient or his 
surrogate has requested would be hard pressed to deny the specific intent to 
cause death, without regard either to the benevolence of his motive or the 
strength of his conviction that the requested treatment would be “futile.” 
Perhaps the most significant impediment to the futility argument in such 
cases is found in the fact that they tend to involve only patients who are 
permanently unconscious.164 A physician who denies such patients the same 
treatment that he would offer to others who are similarly-situated but not 
incapacitated would find it difficult to sustain an argument that he consid-
ered the treatment to be futile and thus “medically inappropriate” or “medi-
cally ineffective” in a physiological sense. The standard of care itself would 
refute an argument that he based his determination of futility on the exercise 
of medical judgment, leaving his subjective determination about the pa-
tient’s quality of life as the only remaining basis for the decision to withhold 
or withdraw treatment.165 
 
entail more than the mere toleration of certain adverse but unavoidable risks; it would affirm-
atively embrace a lethal purpose. See id. at 20. 
 162. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702; Quill, 521 U.S. at 802, 807–08. 
 163. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 2, § 12.03[C][5]. 
 164. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Baby K, 
16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992); In re Wanglie, No. PX-
91-283 (Minn. Prob. Ct. Hennepin Cnty. June 28, 1991), reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 369 
(1991); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 165. The state’s interest in preserving life also would directly challenge a physician’s 
reliance on the concept of medical futility to justify the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment that either a patient or his surrogate has requested. This conclusion is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. 
Quill that a state’s interest in preserving life is not subject to “judgments about the ‘quality’ 
of life that a particular individual may enjoy,” and that a state may assert that interest “even 
for those who are near death.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729–30 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 
282). Although a state’s advance directive statute might reflect an implicit waiver of its inter-
est in preserving life to the extent the law expressly acknowledges an individual’s unqualified 
right to refuse treatment, reason posits that the state would have retained its interest with 
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In light of this fundamental problem, it is submitted that advance di-
rective statutes need not and should not be construed to vest in physicians 
the sole decision-making authority concerning the provision of life-
sustaining treatment. This is not to deny the importance of these decisions to 
physicians and other members of the health care team, but to recognize that 
entrusting these matters to the sole discretion of the medical profession 
would merely beg a question of profound significance to a variety of inter-
ested parties. In particular, it would be unrealistic to expect such a deference 
to adequately address the interests of the patient, his family, and society in 
these matters. 
We could take comfort in those interests being properly weighed, how-
ever, if the states were to implement a meaningful process designed to forge 
a consensus about the appropriate treatment regimen when the views of the 
physician and the patient’s (as expressed by his surrogate) diverge. Properly 
structured, such a process could serve not only to reconcile these conflicts, 
but to return advance directive statutes to their original legal and ethical 
moorings. Just as physician-assisted death has been recognized as “far too 
dangerous a right to be exercised by patients and physicians alone,”166 it 
would be even more dangerous to place in a physician’s hand the unilateral 
authority to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a patient 
who has requested it because to do so would effectively condone involun-
tary euthanasia. 
These concerns that attend a physician’s refusal to satisfy a patient’s 
affirmative request for treatment are compounded when the issue is placed 
in the context of the second type of futility case discussed in this Article. 
This complexity stems from the difficulty of distinguishing palliative seda-
tion to unconsciousness from voluntary euthanasia in certain cases. In light 
of that potential identity, reason suggests that the law would accommodate 
the right of a patient to couple the act of sedation with the withholding of 
nutrition and hydration only when the combination is justified by the doc-
trine of double effect. In this manner, the law would ensure that the decision 
reflects the same determination of objective futility that advance directive 
statutes implicitly recognize when a patient has exercised his right to forego 
life-sustaining treatment.167 Moreover, to so limit these interventions would 
both align the law with professional standards of medical practice,168 and 
minimize the risk that they would be exploited as opportunities to engage in 
voluntary euthanasia under the guise of a legitimate medical procedure. 
 
respect to forms of treatment and circumstances that fall beyond the express scope of the law. 
See discussion supra notes 63–72 and accompanying text. 
 166. Brief for Bioethics Professors Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 
115, at 29. 
 167. See discussion supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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Although we might be inclined to consider these presentations of medi-
cal futility as raising merely abstract matters of law, bioethics, and the pro-
fessional standard of medical care, at the core of these questions lies the 
very practical and fundamental concerns about the value we should ascribe 
to each other as human beings: either (i) we consider ourselves as having an 
inherent and unchanging value that exists independently of any capacity we 
may possess at any point in time during our lives, or (ii) we perceive our-
selves as objects whose worth is derived, not from our nature as human be-
ings, but from the benefit others might find in our continued biological ex-
istence in our present state of functional capacity.169 It is submitted that the 
rule of law would have meaning only under the first of these premises. By 
definition, the alternative thesis would define “law” as whatever the majori-
ty might prefer from time to time, thereby relegating to their subjective pref-
erence one’s right to continue his physical existence. The rule of law would 
be especially precarious in a world so ordered. 
Professor Budziszewski has said that to define any animate being or in-
animate thing with reference to its functional capacity would be “appropri-
ate for things that have no inherent nature, whose identity is dependent on 
our purposes and interests in them—things that do not intrinsically deserve 
to be regarded in a certain way, but which may be regarded in any way 
which is most convenient.”170 C. S. Lewis expressed the same concept in his 
work entitled The Abolition of Man: “when we understand a thing analyti-
cally and then dominate and use it for our own convenience, we reduce it to 
the level of ‘Nature’ in the sense that we suspend our judgements [sic] of 
value about it, ignore its final cause (if any), and treat it in terms of quanti-
ty.”171 As applied to human beings, therefore, both Budziszewski and Lewis 
would reject the functional, relative view of value. In fact, Lewis went so far 
as to suggest that when a society comes to regard man as a mere object of 
relative value, it not only deceives itself, but does so at its peril: 
[A]s soon as we . . . reduc[e] our own species to the level of mere Nature 
[“nature” being something “of that which knows no values as against 
 
 169. By holding that a competent person’s right to refuse medical treatment survives the 
loss of capacity, the jurisprudence concerning patient rights at the end of life has consistently 
acknowledged that all persons have an inherent value that exists independently of their deci-
sion-making capacity at any point during their biological existence. It follows that a person’s 
inherent value derives from his nature as a human being rather than from his physical or 
intellectual capacity. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702; Quill, 521 U.S. 793; Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261; 
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664. 
 170. BUDZISZEWSKI, supra note 1, at 76. 
 171. C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 69 (HarperOne 2001). 
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that which both has and perceives value”], . . . the being who stood to 
gain and the being who has been sacrificed is one and the same.172  
Previously in that work Lewis had written the following: 
Man’s conquest of Nature turns out, in the moment of its consummation, 
to be Nature’s conquest of man. Every victory we seemed to win has 
lead us, step by step, to this conclusion. All Nature’s apparent reverses 
have been but tactical withdrawals. We thought we were beating her 
back when she was luring us on. What looked to us like hands held up in 
surrender was really the opening of arms to enfold us for ever.173 
Although Lewis penned these thoughts more than 60 years ago, their 
portent is assuming an increasing reality in the United States as illustrated 
by decisions in cases such as Causey174 and related legal arguments that ad-
vance directive statutes should be construed to vest in physicians the unilat-
eral authority to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment that a patient 
or his surrogate has requested.175 These developments suggest the ironic 
possibility that one’s right to refuse treatment as set forth in advance di-
rective statutes might be transmuted into an obligation to do so, effectively 
condoning involuntary euthanasia. Likewise, certain applications of extreme 
palliative interventions, if not constrained by traditional ethical norms and 
legal principles of causation on which the right to refuse treatment was 
grounded, could not be logically distinguished from voluntary euthanasia. 
The manner in which the law responds to these renditions of medical 
futility has the potential to influence the future of health care in the United 
States in ways that we can’t completely foresee, but which Lewis suggests 
portend consequences that we would both regret and find difficult to re-
verse. It is submitted that these risks can be avoided if the law remains 
grounded in the common thread that underlies the principles enunciated by 
the courts in In re Quinlan,176 Cruzan,177 In re Conroy,178 Glucksberg179 and 
Quill.180 Each of these cases affirm the law’s recognition of the inherent 
value of human life as reflected in two prisms: (i) the enduring right of each 
individual either to accept or refuse medical treatment, whether through his 
own voice or that of a surrogate who speaks for him, and without regard to 
his state of functional capacity; and (ii) the corresponding unqualified inter-
 
 172. Id. at 71. 
 173. Id. at 68. 
 174. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So.2d 1072 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998). 
 175. See discussion supra notes 72–87 and accompanying text. 
 176. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 177. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 178. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
 179. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 180. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
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est of the state in the preservation of life, including the lives of the weakest 
and most vulnerable among us.181 
This body of jurisprudence implicitly recognizes that each member of 
the species homo sapiens is by definition a bearer of rights and a subject to 
be held in absolute regard, not because of what he can do, but because of 
what he is by nature. In this way, the law presupposes that one’s standing as 
a person who possesses inherent value is not a function either of his condi-
tion, his stage of development at any point in time, or the value that others 
might ascribe to him in light of those characteristics. In the context of the 
specific issues addressed in this Article, it would follow that a patient, 
whether believed to be permanently unconscious or intentionally rendered in 
that state, would be subject to the same regard as any other person whose 
capacity is not compromised. 
 
 
 181. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732 (stating that the prohibition against assisted suicide 
“reflects and reinforces [a state’s] policy that the lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly 
people must be no less valued than the lives of the young and healthy.”). See also Frederick 
R. Parker, Jr., Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill: An Analysis of the Amicus 
Curiae Briefs and the Supreme Court’s Majority and Concurring Opinions, 43 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 469, 526 n.174 (1999). 
